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Abstract 
Abstract of a dissertation submilled in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements fbI' the Degree of Master or Applied Science. 
CultuI'lIl C()I~t1icts ill Resource Management: 
the case (~r Ngiiti KalllUlgllllll lwd Alturiri Estuary 
by M H Palmers 
The accommodation of cultural values appears to be implicit in the Resollrce Managemenl 
Acl 1991. However, cultural values have been identilicd as a cause of tension in making 
decisions about 11IolIgu/natural resourcc usc. To understand how culture affects resource 
management I asked the question: "Cun there be an accommodation of different cultural 
values in the management of luongo/natural resources'?" The case of Ngiili Kahungul1u and 
Te Wlwl1ganlli-a-OroIIlIAlllIriri Estuary, Napier (subject to a Waitangi Tribunal claim), 
provides an example or cultural contlict over both the management and ownership of the 
resources within AllIIriri Estuary. 
Through the usc of qualitative research methods the t(Jllowing intluences on resource 
management were identi tied: cultural paradigms; resource-use rights; and what constituted 
the 'common good'. First, working from a premise that resource management is innuenced 
by cultural beliefs, tikal1ga Miiori and Western resource management start from di tferent 
philosophical bases. The 'secular Western paradigm'{henceforth SWP), as a point on the 
sacred/secular continuum, inllucnces territorial authorities to consider Maori values as 
inappropriate I'or managing natural resources. Second, resource-use rights are based on a 
cultural construction or property rights. The SWP tends to favour private and Crown 
property rights over a cOl11munity-based approach to the management of common resources. 
Third. the SWP also holds the doctrine of 'common good' to be have priority over Maori 
valucs. TiI1() rallgaliralallga is important to Ngcili Kahlll1guf7l1 and the issue of resource 
ownership has yet to be resolved because the second article of the Treaty has been ignored. 
The conclusion is reached that Ngiili Kahlll1glll1u participation, as Treaty partners, in 
l{longo/natural resource management may increase but within the constraints of a SWP. 
One way thrward is for Nglili Kahul1glll1u and Crown to have 'joint management' of 
f(lol/ga/natural resources. Joint management would give both Treaty partners equal 
regulatory control. Such an arrangement would clarify usufruct rights to common resources 
and would incorporate Mliori cultural values into resource management. 
Key words 
Ahuriri Estuary, cultural values, joint management, k(7wul1(1lunga, Ng(7/i Kalllll1gul1l1, 
property rights, qualitative research, ral1galiralanga, I(longa/natural resources 
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Quotation Note 
Respondent confidentiality is protected by the use of pseudonyms. One problem created 
by this strategy is that the readers interpretation of the statement is removed from the 
'context'. To overcome this [ have used one of the following symbols with each quote to 
provide an overall context and the respondent's group affiliation. 
Ng((/i Kahul1gllllu: • 
• Orlicial: 
Other: 
This simplification of group classification was used for ease of interpretation. [accept that 
it does not provide for the diversity of opinion that might be encountered in each group. 
'Onicials' were staff or councillors from the telTitorial authorities which had legislative 
responsibility for Tl! Whanganlli-a-()m/llIAhllriri Estuary. The' Ng(lti Kahungunu' group 
also inc ludes the expert wi tnesses (Maori and Pakl!!/C/) who supported the tribe's Wa i tangi 
Tribunal claim. 
The pseudonyms and their affiliations are: 
Adam: • Waitangi Tribunal expert witness, a ?6kehci 
Alan: 
Anne: 
Dave: 
Doug: 
Earl: 
Eric: 
Fred: 
Gary: 
Harry: 
Henry: 
.lane: 
Luke: 
Mary: 
Mike: 
Paul: 
Ray: 
Sean: 
Steve: 
• Ngc7/i Kahllngllnll kal/matlla, Taiwhenua committee member 
• Napier City Council (henceforth NCC) 
• Ahuriri Executive Committee, New Zealand Maori Coullcil 
• Department of Conservation (henceforth DoC) 
• Napier City Council 
• Hawke's Bay Regional Council (henceforth HBRC) 
• Tikal/ga Maori expert 
• Hawke's Bay Fish and Game Council 
• Department of Conservation, HBRC Maori Committee member 
• Hastings District Council (henceforth HOC) 
• Ahuriri Protection Society - conservation interest group 
~ Past Catchment Board member 
~ Ahuriri Estuary resource user 
• Hawke's Bay Regional Council 
~ Ahuriri Estuary resource user 
• Hastings District Council 
• Waitangi Tribunal expert witness 
• Hastings District Council, Taiwhenua Committee member 
Ted: ~ Although Maori he was not tangala whenua 
For quick reference, this list is included at the end of the dissertation, in rold-out form 
(see p89). 
IV 
Foreword 
Historical contexts and cultural paradigms are important in understanding a people's 
association with, and lise of. particular natural resources. For this reason it was necessary 
to provide a brief discllssion of AOlearoalNew Zealand history and to outline the 
antecedents of the secular Western paradigm to present the context of this rescnrch. 
Looking into Ngc7li Kulllll1gllnll values provides the other side of this context. 
Te Tirili () Wailangi is a covenant signed by our Maori and Pdke/Jti ancestors. The phrase 
'AolearoalNew Zealand' denotes a country which has been settled by Maori and Fake/nl, 
who have a relationship based on the Treaty. All too quickly this Treaty was set aside by 
generations or settlers. Today, past injustices need to be resolved lairly and in good laith 
for effective reconciliation. This reconciliation might have the potential to usher in an 
equal partnership hetween the Crown and langala whenllo. To avoid perpetuating any 
further injustices, or ecological degradation, and to honour the Treaty, there is a need for 
Trenty claims to be settled and a joint environmental management strategy implemented. 
As a Pdke!u{ New Zealander I accept that the physical cosmos is an expression of a 
spiritual reality. Spirituality is at the heart of the Ngiili Ka!1lll1gul1t1 culture and it imbues 
their language. Te Reo is an expression of mana l110luhake and is considered a taonga. 
Therefore italics are used lor Mc/ori words. Also the phrase 't({ongalnatural resources' is 
cognisant of the cultural nuances in meaning attributed to the land, water, flora and fauna. 
The earl ier name 'Te Whal1gallui-a-Orolu' (on maps circa 1850) is used for Ahuriri 
Estuary, although it was 'lost' through colonisation. Likewise Ng{tli Kahungul1lf lost 
control of their resources. 
This dissertation considers the provision for cultural and spiritual concepts in the Resource 
Mallagemenl Acl 1991. All interpretations expressed in this paper, except those quoted, are 
those of the author as are any mistakes and omissions. I hope that this discllssion provides 
the basis for seeking an equal partnership between the Crown and lallgala whenua. 
A glossary of MiiOf'i temlS Llsed in this dissertation is attached helow. 
Glossary of Maori Terms used in Text 
Alua 
awa 
IWPII 
Jllli 
Jo 
iwi 
/wi 11100110 
/wilillki 
Koi I iak i III I1gu 
/((11111 Il/ I llll 
ka~\'alwlal1gll 
mallinga Iwi 
mana 
mlllw Miiori mOlu/wke 
Maori 
M£loril£lllgo 
mlllll1go 
II/alll'i 
mal/riol'a 
milli 
Mollo 
deities 
nver 
sub tribe 
gathering, meeting 
the creator God 
people, tribe 
resources from the sea 
guardian of treasures 
stewardship responsibility for resources 
elder 
governance 
I(Jod resource gathering area 
authority. ability. sovereignty 
Maori sovereignty 
indigenous, ordinary 
essence of being Mdori 
mountain 
life principle, spirit 
human life principle 
greeting 
facial tattoo 
v 
Ngali Kahllngllnu 
pi/ 
East coasLlWairarapa tribe [third largest tribe] 
a tortitied place 
Piike!tii 
Papal/Wlll/ku 
Rallginlli 
langala 11'11('1/11£1 
lool/go 
T(;' RI!o 
likal/go 
Tillo l'allgaliralol1ga 
11IplllW 
stranger and non M£/ori, European 
deity ~ earth mother 
deity - sky father 
occupants of an area 
treasures 
the Maori language 
customs 
highest chieftainship 
ancestors 
llirangaw(/ewae acknowledged place of birth 
wail'll" soul. spirit 
(Sources: Biggs, 1992; Ngata, 1993: Barlow, J 994) 
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Mihi 
Ko Te Mala taku mazmga 
Ko Tukilllki laku awa 
Ko Talimana PakeMi 1\l'i kianga 
i/O Havelock Norlh all 
lena kOllloll lena laloll koloa 
As a lirst generation New Zealander growing up within two cultures, [ discovered how 
culture affects the way people see and do things. This led me to consider how 
AOlearoa/New Zealand's biculturalism affects the management of natural resources. Today 
we have a nation (gco-political) that is made up of two nations (ethnic
'
) bound by the 
Dec/aralion (~( Independence" (1835) and Te Tiriti 0 Wailangi3 (1840) as the 
constitutional foundations of AOlearoa/New Zealand (Brookfield, 19X9). 
constitutional foundations will affect resource management processes. 
Introduction 
These 
Kawharu (I n9) states that the Treaty ot' Wailongi lacks a conceptual framework to 
accommodate two cultures or to devise policies. If the contlict over land and resources 
(Kawharu, 1989; MCHugh, [991) between Mdori and Pakehd is to be resolved then there 
is a need to understand why this tension exists and to develop a suitable procedure to 
remove the source of conflict. Part of the tension is explained by the historical facts of 
land conliscation and resource alienation (Orange, 1987; Binney, 1990; Kelsey, 1990, 
Shaq), 1991). The reason for the tension has had much exploration and is taken as given. 
There may be another reason for such tension, however. I believe that, due to cultural 
factors, there is a fundamental difference in how Maori and Pakehd 'view' natural 
resources. A people's resource management system is based on values derived from both 
a world view and experiences. These constitute a 'paradigm'. Tension potentially exists 
when more than one cultural paradigm is involved in decisions about the use and allocation 
I Elhnic (French) technically refers to a group that is a community with a sense of a common rast and 
culturally spccific beliet:~ (Sharp. 1990:24). Also. describing Aulcoml//Ncw Zealand as a multicultural 
socicty. whi Ie demograrhically correct. mitigates the Treaty and the Declaration or Independcnce. 
1-/(' WlikO/JIIlclIIga () Ic RtIJIgalil'tllollga () Nu nrclli 
The Treaty or IVl/ilill1gi 
2 
of resources. 
I wanted to examine whether the Resource Ma/1agement Act 1991 (henceforth RMA) 
framework has the potential to resolve cultural connicts over natural resources. This 
dissertation, a case-study or 7'(; Wlwl/go/1ui-a-Orotu/A!llIl'iri Estuary (Napier) and Ngc7ti 
KO!llIl1gul1u, is only one study that explores how cultural values are understood and possibly 
included in natural resource planning. Observing the interaction between Ngc7ti Kahul1gul1u 
and the Local Authorities (henceforth LAs4) in regard to resource management provided 
me with an opportunity to explore the issue of how cultural values may affect resource 
management. The case-study considers one specific application of the wider debates of 
Maori sovereignty and their access to, protection or', and rights of traditional use of natural 
resources. Hoperully, it also gives an insight into the philosophical, and therefore 
historical. differences between Maori and Pc7kehli environmental values. My deeper focus 
has been to discern whether there is a value change in Aotearoa/New Zealand society from 
the secular Western Paradigm (henceforth SWP) to a new paradigm that includes 
cultural/spiritual values in natural resource decision making. 1 hope the analysis of this 
case will be lIseful to resource managers and other participants in the resource management 
process by providing a small stone in the bridge between Maori and P{ike!ul 
understandings. 
Part One provides the casc-study's geographical and historical context. In Chapter One 1 
describe the casc-study area of Te Whangal1ui-a-Oro/liIAhuriri Estuary and the association 
of the Ng(lti Ka!llInglll1l1 with it. Chapter Two then examines the literature about Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi and the Declaration of Independence to show that the need for a common law 
bctwecn settlers and Maori that guaranteed Mc10ri control of their natural resources is not 
a new issllc (Hackshaw, 1989: Kawharu, 1989; Binney, 1990; Kelsey, 1990; Sharp, (991). 
Today it is within the sphere of implementing the RMA that these historical issues need to 
be re-addressed. The enactment and purpose of the RMA operates as a common law that 
recognises T(! Tiriti 0 Wa ita ngi and cultural values. For this reason, Chapter Three 
examines the RMA provision for the cultural perspective in resource management. 
Part Two (Chapter Four) provides a discussion of the methodology employed in this study. 
4 In the RMA Sec!. 2; "'Local authority" means a regional council or territorial authority (as detined by 
the Local GOVl!I'/1Il/C'II! Ac! 1974 Sec!. 2( 1 ))'. In this case, the Hawke's Bay Regional COllncil. Napier 
City Council and Hastings District Council have interests in Te W/ulIIg(//lIIi A OrollllAlllIrir; Estuary. 
3 
Part Three presents the results of the case-study and conclusions. My analysis identifies 
three themes as signiricant to the case or Te W/wflgw1lIi-a-OrotllIAhuriri Estuary; these arc 
presented ill Chapters Five to Seven. Chapter Five addresses the question' Do the Maori 
and Pilkehc7 cultures provide difrerent paradigms through which the world is viewed and 
as such, appreciate natural resources di I'ferently'?'. I f cultural factors alter the perception 
of natural resources then it may also alter how natural resources, as 'common property', 
need to be managed. This is the theme of Chapter Six. 
Differences in cultural perceptions or natural resources and the associated differences 
regarding their management raises the issue of which cultural view should be granted 
priority. This related theme is dealt with in Chapter Seven. This chapter discLlsses the 
tension between fino rctl1gatira/ullga and kaw([J1otclI1ga (MCHugh, .1989) in response to the 
question: 'How might Mciori protect natural resources that are culturally important to them 
when this may contl ict with other resource uses'?'. A suggestion ror 'joint managcment' 
(Wickliffe, 1994) as a 'third order or government' (MCHugh, 19H9), separating the issues 
or natural resource ownership from issues of managcment, is presented in Chapter Eight. 
Chaptcr Nine prescnts my conclusions. The appendices provide: the text of TI:' Til'iti 0 
Waitangi; excerpts ['rom the RMA; maps of Te Whanganui-a-O/'o(uIAhuriri Estuary showing 
how the area is divided up between LAs; and the research questions used in the interviews. 
Part One: Setting the Scene 
Cultural Conflicts in Resource Management 
4 
There is a lack 0[' research into the cultural aspects of resource management (MCNeely and 
Pitt, I 9~5; Berkes, 1989). The vague concept of 'culture' incorporates what is collectively 
believed about events, places and people. Eaeh culture affects human behaviour and the 
way a society perceives and treats the natural environment according to its own distinctive 
paradigm. When managing natural resources, contlict arises when there is opposition to, 
or mis-understanding ot~ a particular group's culturally-derived value paradigm concerning 
a particular natural resource. In AOfeamalNew Zealand, a primary research question that 
has not been sufficiently addressed is: 'Can the implementation of the RMA incorporate two 
cultural perspectives for managing faonga 5/natural resources'?' This raises secondary 
research questions: 
* 
* 
* 
Do pake/1{1 managers understand MClori perceptions of natural resources so that they 
can meet the RMA '.'I cultural mandate? 
How do resource managers respond to Mliori cultural values? 
What protection Cor Mciori values is provided by the LAs under the RMA? 
Thc aim orthc preceding questions was to assess whether both tungata wi1el1l1{{ and Pii.kehii. 
values have been accommodated equitably in the resource planning process. Their aim was 
also to ddermine the effectiveness of the methods used to include Miiorilanga and likangu 
in the resource management process used by the LAs which have statutory responsibility 
1'01' Te Whallgolllli-a-()rotllIAhul'il'i Estuary. The issue of acknowledging and 
understanding the tangOIa whenua perspective is addressed by the first question. How 
resource managers perceive and relate to the tangata wilel1lw is the focus of the second 
question, and the third and fourth questions consider how LAs apply the RMA to tangata 
whenI/O. These questions attempt to uncover the underlying tension between the (Clnguta 
wileIJl/a and resource managers' Western cultural paradigms. If this tension exists then it 
is important to know if it is being addressed by resource managers in LAs. The response 
of LAs to tangola whenuu cultural values will affect the allocation of natural resources. 
~ This discussion is concerned with only the latll/ga thai arc generally described us natural resources. the 
land. water. nora and rmmu of Aolea/'(}a/Ncw Zealand. 
5 
Chapter One: 
The History and Description of 
Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary 
1.0 Introduction 
Chapter One describes the case-study area and its history. This provides the local context 
of the research before a description is given of the wider context or the history of 
AOfearoa/New Zealand and the RMA's inception. From this backdrop, the interaction 
between culture and resource management emerges. Te WlulI1gal1l1i-a-OroluIAlllIriri 
Estuary is located in Hawke's Bay between '\Japier City and its airport (Figure I). The 
Maori tribe which used and inhabited this area prior to European settlement was Ng£7/i 
K aillingllllll. 
1.1 Miio"; Habitation of Te Whangallui-a-Orotu 
Nglili Ka/1ulIglll1l1 have inhabited Te Whal1gCll1l1i-a-Oro/uIAhuriri Estuary for about 1100 
years (Appendix I). There is mllch evidence ofpii settlements on the headlands and shel1-
filled middens above the shore line of the original beaches (Best, 1982; Parsons, 1994). 
The abundant supply of Iwi /1/0Cln(/ and its favourable climate, along with the natural 
defense afforded by the topography of the area, made this an attractive place for Maori to 
settle. The following hapt7 consider Te Whal1gal1ui-a-Orotu to be their ttlml1gaYl'aewae: 
Ngati Parau. Ng(ili Hinepare. Ng(iti Tu. Ngati Maim. Ngai Tawhao. Ngai Te RlIl'uku and 
Ng£7ti Ma/(;'pu (Dick, 1992; Parsons, 1994). NgiUi Kahlll1gUl1ll, in pre-European times, 
managed Te W/wl1gal1ui-a-Orotu to ensure a continued supply of kai 1110((11(1 and crops. 
They controlled the lagoon's water level with a temporary opening to the sea so that they 
could crop the lagoon's fertile perimeter (Wed 55 1). McLeal1~, in 1851, bought the land 
around Te Wlllmgamti-a-Orolll, but Ngati Kahlll1gul111 never sold the lagoon (Wai 55). 
1.2 Ahuriri Estuary Today 
Today, AllIIl'il'i Estuary forms the northwest edge of Napier City, which is the remnant of 
Te Wlu/Ilgmllli-a-Ol'otll. The 1931 earthquake and subsequent land rec lamation has 
modified this coastal wetland, reducing it from 3,840 hectares to 275 hectares. Drainage 
Numbering refers to the Wuitungi Tribunul cuse and evidence references. 
Donald McLean wm; the native secretary and chief land purchasing commissioner 
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works included re-routing the TlItaekliri (river) directly into the sea, thus reducing water 
flow into the estuary and affecting estuary tidal processes (Knox, 197R). Williams (Wai 
55) submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal that if the lagoon were not subjected to stop-banks, 
drainage works or pumped 24 hours a day, it would have remained much larger. 
To manage Te W/lCIl1galllli-a-Ol'OtlIIAhllriri Estuary, the LAs have divided it into three 
areas: the lower. the middle and the upper estuary (Appendix Two). The estuary entrance 
is the 'Inner Harbour' that provides berths for yachts, commercial fishing boats and a 
slipway. This area is flanked on the southern shore by warehouses and commercial 
development and the northern shore is predominantly residential. Further to the south-west, 
along the middle estuary, is the industrial development of Onekawa. Much of the 
reclaimed land is grazed and lIsed for the Napier airport (Appendix Three). The remaining 
wetland areas have significant wildli fe values, part being gazetted as a wildlife refuge in 
195R. The wildlife refuge, being a sheltered site, is in demand for active water-based 
recreation (A /lIlriri Estllc//:F Drq/i Managemellt Plan Suhmissions, 1993). because Napier 
is a popular summer holiday and weekend destination. Most active recreation occurs 
around Pandora Pond, an area that was dredged and protected from the tides by a 
constructed rock wall. Pundora Pond has recreational facilities and businesses located on 
its southcl11 shore. The upper reaches of the estuary are flanked by farmland and ai'c lIsed 
for duck-shooting. Ahllriri Estuary is enclosed by pasture covered hills along the westcrn 
side, and takes the water from this catchment. 
J.3 Why use Ahuriri Estuary and Ngiiti Kahungunu as a case-study? 
The research focuses 011 an estuarine area for the f()l1owing reasons: lirst. estuaries are 
often ecologically degraded; secondly, much of Ao/e(fl'Oa/New Zealand's urban 
development has occurred in proximity to sllch wetlands; thirdly. for many years wetlands 
were regarded by Europeans as 'waste' places to be ti lied in (however, there is an 
increasing awareness of the importance of these areas); and fourthly, many remnant 
wetlands are important to tangata whenua (Rennie, 1993; Ward and Scarf, 1993). The case 
or Te WhungwlIIi-a-OrotuIAlllIriri Estuary encompasses the issues of conflicting cultural 
values and resource lise, as well as dispute over the ownership of the resources contained 
within the estuary, thereby highlighting Treaty issues. Estuaries are locations of high 
potential conniet because of the contrasting values ascribed to them, the diverse uses that 
might be made of them, and the changing attitudes towards them, Consequently, some 
Waitangi Tribunal claims are about wetland areas, including AlllIriri Estuary, 
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Chapter Two: 
AotearoalNew Zealand History 
2.0 Introduction 
Having described Te W/llIl1gal1ui-a-Oro/uIAhuriri Estuary, I will now present a brief 
summary of AO/(loroa/New Zealand history. This will illustrate how Milori cultural values, 
relating to luol1go/natural resources, have been disregarded by the Crown. 
2.1 The Declaration of Independence of 1835 
Growing international trade, and perceived military threats, increasing settler numbers and 
the need for Mc/orf unity precipitated the Declaration of Independence in 1835. The 
commissioning of an AOlearoa/New Zealand flag
' 
was prompted by a need to ensure 
commercial and legal protection for ships which were being confiscated when they arrived 
in New South Wales (Binney, 1990). James Busby (the British Resident) is credited with 
the idea of a nag and linking 'the problem of registration with the notion of creating a 
settled form 0 f Melori government' (ibid.: 29), The ra ising of a flag for commercia I reasons, 
the need for a common law by which to govern Mdori and pake/u/ to aid European 
settlement, pillS the threat of French annexation, provided a political opportunity for the 
Milori Declaration ofindepcndcnce on 28 October 18352, For Mao"; the acceptance of 
Iheir !lag and Declaration of Independence was a recognition of their mana, and 
sovereignty over the land by the British Crown - "Ko te Kingitanga ko Ie mana i Ie yvenua 
(sic)" (Binney, 1990:3 I). Five years after the Declaration of Independence, a treaty was 
signed at a /wi in Waifangi which guaranteed Crown protection of Milori interests as the 
protectorate or Maori sovereignty and independence. 
2.2 Te Tiriti 0 WaitangilThe Treaty of Waitangi 
The signing or u treaty was motivated by the differing desires of Maori, missionaries, 
settlers and Crown. Mclori, in response to missionary advice (Williams, 1989), were 
looking for the protection of their sovereignty by the British and the provision of one luw 
for themselves and the settlers (Ngata, 1922 translated by Jones n.d., cited in Biggs, 1989), 
with the ensuing trade benefits. Milori understood that a dual sovereignty would operate 
I The tlag design was chosen by 34 Northern Chiefs on 20 March 1 H34. 
1 
- Busby initially collected 34 signatures, from the United Tribes of ;/o/r.'uI'IJu/Ncw Zealand. in NOIihlanti. 
lind eontinlled \0 ohtain signutures until 1 R39 (Binney. 1(90). 
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with the assurance that the Chiefs' authority would not be diminished by a treaty, and that 
their Cbienainship was intact and the land was theirs (Binney 1990; Kelsey, 1990; MCHugh 
1994). The March 1 H40 eye-witness account of Father Louis-Catherin Servant, a French 
Catholic priest, suggests that both Mdori and Pdke/ul understood that: 
The governor proposes to the tJ'iiJo/ chie.f.\· that they recognise his ([uthority: 
he gives t/relll to Ilnderstand that his autho/'ity is to maintain good order, 
and protect tllid,. respective intcrests; that all the chh:f.\· will preserve their 
powers aI/(/ their possessions (Binney, 1990:77). 
Thc missionaries had sought a t.reaty for the following reasons: their perceived need for 
British protection becuuse of their tenuous position of reliance on Mc/ori goodwill; the 
rumoured French 'invasion'; an increasing Roman Catholic presence; and their concern for 
Maori welfare (Kelsey, 1984). 
Governor Hobson may have been iii Iluenced by the Church Missionary Society's 
humanitarian pleas. He was aware that militarily and politically the power was with the 
Me/ori people (Williams, in Kawharu, 1989). The British Crown was, however, ambivalent 
in its support for the annexation of AotearoalNew Zealand or the use of a treaty for such 
a purpose (Sinclair, 1980; Kelsey, in Spoonley et. (I/" 1984). The Crown was unwilling 
to finance colonisation or to maintain a strong military presence. For these reasons, 
Governor Hobson instituted a treaty with Maori. Hobson also instigated the Crown's sole 
right of pre-emption to purchase land from Maori for subsequent resale to settlers as a way 
to finance colonisation (Bassett, 1990). These arrangements did not sit well with the 
settlers. 
Some prominent settlers criticised the Government's making of, and reliance upon. a Treaty 
(Williams, 1989). They saw the Crown's doctrine of pre-emption as hindering their 
acquisition of land. They argued that it made the Treaty's Third Article a fraud because 
tvWol'i. as British SUbjects, had the right to sell land to whomever they chose (Bassett, 
199()). By the 111id-1840s the first wave of natural resource extraction, whale, seals, kauri 
timber and gUill, copper ore and some coaL was almost over and settlements were in 
decline (ihid.): the first settlers needed to attract other colonists so they could profit from 
land sales. The settlers, in time, also dismissed the Treaty as being of no significance to 
them. With increasing numbers they developed sufficient political and military strength 
to ignore the Miiori people. This removed any protection of tangata wilenll(l resources 
which the Treaty, or rangati}'(ltanga, (Brookfield, 1989; Kelsey, 1990) might have provided. 
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2.2.1 Translating Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi 
English translations of Te Tirili 0 Waitangi (for the full texts see Appendix Four) do not 
match the Mc70ri translation (Figure 2). Sharp (1991) questions the wisdom of trying to 
reinterpret the meaning of a historical event and its documents because history cannot be 
recreated, but he afIirms the Waitangi Tribunal findings that Maori never ceded their 
sovereignty. Spooniey (1984) also emphasises that Pc7kelul need to understand what Te 
Tirili 0 Wailangi means to Maori. Hence both culture and era affect the interpretation of 
Te Tirili () Waitangi. 
The language used in the Treaty is more than the written words (Williams, 1989). Maori 
Chiefs lIsed Moko inscriptions as their signatures, so the essence of their mww was 
inscribed into the Treaty document (Binney 1990; Glen, 1992). Sir Ngata Apirana (1922, 
cited in Biggs, 1989) called the Treaty articles 'covenants'; an agreement. made with God 
as witness, that are irrevocable unless both parties Illutually agree to amend them. 'It 
bound both parties because it was an oath in the sight of God' (Sharp. 1991 :97). Te Tirili 
o Wailangi was written in 'missionary Maori' because tbe author was Rev. Henry 
Williams, and Maori had learnt English from the Bible (Biggs, 1989; Williams, 1989). The 
use of 'religious' language fitted the Maori world view of making no distinction between 
the sacred and secular (see Chapter Five). The Waitangi Tribunal's sCnltiny of the history 
and Maori interpretation of Te Tirili 0 Wailangi concludes that the Treaty is imbued with. 
waifI/O lhat transcends the literal interpretation of the text (Waitangi Tribunal, 1983). 
Miiori relied on Henry William's oral arguments in giving their consent to the Treaty 
(Sorrenson, 1(89). This Treaty is a Magno Carla (MCHugh, 1991; Williams, 1989) because 
the Miio/'i version of it legally ddines langola wi1enll(l rights, and Miiori expected the 
Crown to honour it. The mixture of motives, expectations, and poor translation, however, 
led to Te Tit'itt' 0 Waitangi being ignored by Piikelui. 
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Article 1 - what is being given by the .~[iiori to the Crown? 
AHiori text 
te kmwmatanga katoa 
English Text 
all the rights and powers 
of Sovereignty 
YOllng Translation 
all the government 
YOllng Translation 
nga tikanga me nga malla karoa a te 
Rallgatiratanga 
Kml'lwru Translarion 
government complete 
Ngata '£'tp/anatioll' 
te rlllo mana, 
Ie mana raJ/gatira 
Article 2 - what was the Crown's guarantee to the Miiori in respect of their land etc:? 
Mliori text 
te tina rangatiratanga 
Eng/ish Text 
full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession 
YOllng Trans/ation 
full chieftainship 
Young Translation 
te tina tlltllrlltanga 
Kawharu Trails/arion 
the unqualified exercise 
their chieftainship 
Ngata 'Explanation' 
Ie whakapllmalltanga 
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2.2.2 Te Tiriti 0 Waitallgi and the RMA 1991 
Within the framework of the RMA the management of natural resources cannot be separated· 
from Te Tirfti 0 Waitangi (Appendix Four) or what it means to Me/ori. The history of 
legislation in Aole(J/'O(JINew Zealand is imbued with the Crown's response, or lack of it, 
to Te Tiriti 0 Wailangf (Kelsey, 1984). An outcome of the Maori cultural renaissance is 
an increasing understanding of the importance of Te Tirili 0 Waitallgi (Spoonley el (//., 
1984; Kelsey, 1984; Orange, 1987; Walker, 1987; Tauroa, \989; Kawharu 1989; Kelsey, 
1990: Binney, 1990; Sharp, J 991; MCHugh, 1991). Te Titftf 0 Waf/ang! has passed from 
being declared a legal 'nullity' in 1877 (the "Prendergast decision") (Orange, 1987) to 
being legislated for in the Tteal)! (~l Wailangi Act 1975 and endorsed in the Waitangi 
Tribunal's ['ormation and reform (Sharp, 1991). Treaty 'clauses'·' are also incorporated 
into the f?MA sections 6{e), 7{a), and 8 (see Appendix Five). The interpretation of these 
sections, and the priority they are given, will reflect the Crown's commitment to its Treaty 
obligations. 
The Waitangi Tribunal's work is to consider independently the history and the processes 
by which Mt/ori may have been illegitimately alienated from their laongalnatural resources. 
The Tribunal's recommendations bear directly on how taonga/natural resources might be 
administered and who owns them. Hughes (1988: 19), on the basis of Waitangi Tribunal 
findings, described the relationship between the Te Tirili 0 Wailangi First and Second 
Articles as 'the essential bargain'. The Crown's right to govern, kawanatangll, is 
dependent upon the protection of Milori sovereignty, tino l'ongolira/clI1ga, in the access to 
and use of taongalnatural resources. It is on this understanding that Ngciti Ka/llIl1gul1l1 
agreed to a partnership of dual sovereignty, a sharing or power (Kawharu, 1989), based on 
Te Tiriti () Wailangi (see Chapter Seven). 
2.2.3 Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi and the Role of the State 
During the mid-to-late 19808, Maar! were caught lip in the redefinition of the role of the 
state and how govcl11l11ent related to iwi (Runanga !wi Act 1990; Fleras, 1991; M'Gregor, 
19(3). The Treaty of Waitangi became the central document by which the relationship 
between Crown and MClori was defined (Kelsey, 1990; Fleras, 1991), The crux of the 
.' Other environment/resource legislation that also include Treaty clauses are the; El1l'il'Ol1117elll Act 191<,6, 
COIlS(!/'I'1I1io" Al'l 1987, and T(! Ture W/lelluaIM£iol'i Land Ac/ 1993 s2 which states that the Maori version 
of Te Tir/li () Wai/ang/ prevails over the English version. 
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changes in administering the Crown's relationship with langala whel1l1a was to make iwi 
central to the delivery or government services to Me/ori and keep iwi accountable. The 
question of state control and the ambiguity of devolution was of critical concern to Maori 
(F1cras, 1991; MCGregor, 1993) who argued for 'repossession of resources and restoration 
of power and the reclamation or mana' by tangula whenua hapiiliwi as co-signatories of 
Te Til'ili () Wailangi (Fleras, 1991: 186). Herein is the link between Miiori aspirations to 
have Te Til'iti () Wuilangi honoured and to be involved directly in the management of 
luonga/natural resources. 
It was not long before kawcll1C1langa came into conflict with fino /'al1gafiratanga (Binney, 
1990). The land (sovereignty) wars in the 1860s and the expulsion of Mc70ri leaders was 
a military invasion of AOfearoalNew Zealand by the British Crown (Brookfield, 19R9; 
Binney, 1990). In the I 870s and 1880s the Repudialion movement had the explicit aim of 
repossessing alienated lands on the basis that 'rull chieftainship of their territories' (Binney, 
1990: J 57) had been promised. J nitially the Repudiation movement worked with lawyers 
and parliamentarians but lhis was to its detriment. The response was to establish a pan-
Maori kolahilClJlga (Parliament), which was founded by Ngc7ti KallUlIglll1 II , who had been 
loyal to the Crown. In 1886 Ngclti Kahungul1u called a Iwi to discuss new land legislation 
with the Crown. The ensuing legislation also ignored the need for Maori control of their 
land (ibid.). During the 1880s and I 890s the hope for unity, amongst iwi\ was supplanted 
by the power struggles between kolahitanga and kingitanga and the various visionary 
leaders who held sway over different regions and hapli. These were difficult times for 
many ill'i. Ngclfi Kahunglll1l1 had supported the colonial authorities and lost their land 
whilst doing so (Binney, 1990; Morgan and Falloon, 1993; Parsons, 1994). 
Maori understood that under Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi power was to be shared, but the' Crown 
saw it as a transfer of power with Maori becoming subjects (Kawharu, 1989) (see Chapter 
Seven). Binney (1990) concludes that the Piikelu] feared separatism and so were not 
prepared to allow any torm of power-sharing or to let Maori control their own land and 
refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Maori grievances. Such Pakehii attitudes 
alienated Mciori leadership and have 'sown the seeds of a discord which has lasted to the 
present' (ibid.). The Maori call for sovereignty is at the heart of Aotearoa/New Zealand 
history. The Crown bad imposed its own political and legal mechanisms (Brookfield, 1989; 
Binney, 1990; Kelsey, 1990) by which it ensured access to resources for the settlers' 
economic development. The authority to regulate faonga/natural resource use is a powerful 
14 
mcchanism lor controlling people and their aspirations. 
The Fourth Labour Govel11ment's (1984-1990) restructuring of its own departments and 
local government authorities affected Ngciti Kahllngunu and the management of 
WI1lIllgalllli-a-OI'OI1iIAlllIl'iri Estuary. Therc were changes ;n AllIIriri land ownership 
through the privatisation of the Harbour Board into a Port authority and the creation of new 
LA through local govcrnment restructuring and amalgamation. The impact of government 
restructuring in the case of Ng(lfi Kahunglll1u included issues of devolution and resource 
management under the RW1Cl/1ga Iwi Act 1990. Ngiiti Kahungul1l1 had to deal with the 
demands of consultation (Kerins, \992; Waaka, 1992) with these newly created agencies. 
The restructuring, which preceded the RMAs enactment, also changed how the LAs would 
be required to respond to NgLlti Kahul1gullu cultural values, because of the increasing use 
of 'Treaty clauses' in new legislation. 
Before considering how the RMA deals with the cultural aspects of environmental planning, 
it is necessary to outline the political context in which the RMA developed. 
Chapter Three: 
The Enactment and Purpose of the 
Resource Managentent Act 1991 
3.0 Introduction 
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The Fourth Labour Government implemented policies which were based on a free market 
ideology and aimed at reducing the 'role of the state' (Boston and Holland, 1987; Buhrs 
and Bartlett, 1993). This change was promoted by Treasury (ihfd.). It led to the 
restructuring of local government to provide a consistent co-ordination of policy to l'it the 
'New Right' ideology (Buhrs and Bartlett, 1993). [n response to Treasury ideology, 
business interests and environmental concerns, the Fourth Labour Government also sct 
about reviewing and reforming environmental legislation and administration, leading to the 
Resource Management Bill 1990 which preceded the R(!sollrce Management Act 1991 
(Bilhrs and Bartlett, 1993; Memon and Perkins, 1993: Rainbow, 1993). 
3.1 The Enactment of the Resource Management Act 1991 
The RMA was designed to enable LAs to develop environmental policy in ways that were 
consistent with the Treasury's laissez-:fllire market philosophy. This philosophy deemed 
that the market would also be able to determine environmental outcomes if bureaucratic 
control was minimised and urban planning was curtailed (BOhrs and Bartlett, 1993). 
Treasury's proposals paralleled business' concerns that existing legislation was too 
bureaucratic, uncoordinated and hindered economic development (Wheeler, 1987; Rainbow, 
1993). Subsequently, the RMA streamlined development bureaucracy by providing'a 'one-
stop-shop' for all resource allocation and planning. 
Environmental groups, unlike Treasury and business interests, wanted the state to be more 
proactive in environmental protection and conservation (Rainbow, 1993). Environmentalists 
also saw a lack of cohesion in the plethora of environmental legislation (iNd.), They 
argued that the state perpetuated environmental degradation because ofcontlicting mandates 
within existing departments; that of environmental protection and that of resource 
development (Bilhrs and Bartlett, 1993). Treasury also wanted a clear separation of 
mandates. Treasury then went one step further and advocated the separation of policy 
design and policy implementation. The separation of mandates, policy design and 
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implcmcntation led to the demise of some departments, the creation of new ones l and the 
establishment of State Owned Enterprises. The envi ronmentalists' advocate tor 
conservation became newly established in the Department of Conservation (Conservatio/1 
Act 19;)7). The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment is the environmental 
policy 'watchdog' and could investigate issues, but has no decision-making power (ihic/). 
The Ministry for the Environment develops environmental policy, and the LAs bccome 
environmental policy implementors. The massive government restructuring, on the basis 
of a laissez-:/i:tire market philosophy, reinforced private property rights (Chapter Six), and 
down played Ivhiori Treaty claims 
3.2 The Purpose of the Resource Management Act 1991 
The RMA Purpose alld Principles Part II Section 5(/) and (2) (Appendix Five) gives 
priority to the sustainable management of natural resources (excluding minerals), and 
becomes an ecological "bottom line" (Rainbow, 1993). While the RMA also has the 
objective of sustaining the social, economic and cultural wellbeing of communities, there 
is no definition of sustainability in regard to urban and social process (Memon, 1993). The 
RMA does not fit the free market philosophy because it also promotes community-based 
resource management decision making (Rennie, 1993). Herein is the dilemma of protecting 
the bio-physical world whi 1st utilising it to maintain/deve lop the wei fare of people (Buhrs, 
1993). Consequently, there is an allowance for traditional Maori laol1galnatural resource 
managemcnt practices, but protection of the bio-physical environment takes priority. 
However, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de 
Janeiro, June 1992) advocated that traditional indigenolls knowledge and practices have a 
vital role in managing natural resources. The lack of definition of cultural sustainability 
and hesitancy to consider alternative management strategies may hinder the inclusion of 
cultural wellbeing in implementing the RMA. 
3.3 Interim Summary 
Part One introduced the case-study area of Te Wlumgwmi-a-Orotu/AIlIlriri Estuary, the 
history of AO/(!({l'Oa/New Zealand and thc RMA's enactment and purpose. This provided 
a background to the cultural values conflict over the management of taanga/natural 
resources. In Part Two, I will explain how I conducted the research. This will help the 
reader to understand how the data were gathered and analysed. 
I The Department of Lands and Survey, New Zealand Forest Service, and the Ministry of Works were 
abolished (Memon. 1(93). The Department of Conservation. Forestry Corporation, Landcorp, Department 
of Lands and Survey Information, Ministry for the Environment were created. 
17 
Part Two: Obtaining the Evidence 
Chapter Four: 
Methodology 
4.0 I ntrod uction 
My aim in this chapter is to describe bow I collected and analysed the data in the case of 
Ngllti Ka!JlIngullu and the management of Alwril'i Estuary. I first outline the reasons why 
I used a qualitativc methodology. Then I will discuss how I did the research and how I 
resolved some of the research problems I experienced. 
My examination of resource management literature, the Ahuriri Drafi Management Plan 
and the RMA 's purpose led me to consider; "How important is the issue of cultural valucs 
when managing natural resources'?". To gain an understanding of how culture and resource 
management are linked, I started by considering the Treaty of Waitangi and Aotearoa/New 
Zealand's history. I then decided that a case-study might be helpful to provide a 'living' 
perspective of the issues. This then meant deciding on a location, gaining iwi consent and 
choosing an appropriate research methodology. I chose to use qualitative research methods. 
4.1 Why use Qualitative Research Methods? 
I lIsed qualitative research methods for the following reasons. First, Mliori culture 
functions through oral traditions and personal relationships, therefore the use of written 
questionnaire formats was inappropriate. Second, 1 believed that the nuances of cultural 
meanings attributed to natural resources and their management would not be easily 
quantified. Third, the limited public knowledge of how cultural values influence 
f(tonga/natural resource management decisions requires an approach to research which is 
nexihle and orientated towards 'discovery' rather than 'validation' (Rudner, 1966). 
Qualitative research aims to discover reality through the consensus and contlicts in the 
stories being told by different participants (Lotland and Lofland, 1984). Those involved 
have their own agendas and values which influence their perceptions and actions. The 
researcher, through observation and/or participation, seeks to understand what is happening 
and why. When exploring social/political settings, qualitative data are the "best and 
richest" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: t 7). 
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4.2 How the Research was Done 
My research role was that of an 'outside researcher' (Lolland and Lofland, 1984) for whom 
knowledge, connections, accounts and courtesy would facilitate access into the research 
field (ibid.). Having some understanding of Te Whangal1ui-a-Orotu/AllIIr;ri Estuary's 
geography, I set out to familiarise myself with its history and the Ngclti Kahul1gul111 
Waitangi Tribunal claims. I needed to be conversant with: resource management issues, 
LAs functions under the RMA and the political nature of cross-cultural research. Getting 
into the field required identifying and gaining the support of 'key players' involved in the 
management of Te Whangal1ui-a-Orotll/Ahuriri Estuary. 
Contact with Ng{iti Kahungul1ll was assisted by the Centre for Metod Studies and Research, 
Lincoln University, which provided an opportunity to present Illy research proposal to a 
Ngc7ti Kahllllgllflll representative. Developing relationships, reciprocity and place of origin 
are importanl to Maori. So, in part, gaining informed consent for the research was the 
result of discllssing their research needs. During this process a specific research focus 
developed (ShalTir and Stebbins, 1991) in light of a concern that; 
Harry • ... Maori values alld views regarding resource management 
mllst he considered as valid in the planning system. 
The Ng(7ti Kahllnglfl1l1 requirement, that fikanga Maori be part of t(1ol1ga/natural resource 
management, overlapped with my proposed research into how LAs accommodate cultural 
values when implementing the RMA. Research involving tangara w/tel1l1(1 would have to 
be based on goodwill, reflecting the 'partnership spirit' of Te Tiriti 0 Waifangi. Therefore 
Ngc7ti Kahul1gul1u formed an "infornlal contact group" (in Piikeha terms) to act as a primary 
point of contact during the research. This assisted me in relating to Ngiifi Kalwl1gullll and 
clarifying their perspective. Section 4.3 discllsses the implications of Ngliti Kahul1guflu 
involvement. 
A 'plain English' account of the research was presented to all potential infonnants, 
explaining the research purpose and how it would be carried out, making the study process 
explicit. The aim was to gain inf()(1ned consent and support from 'gate keepers' (Lofland 
and Lolland, 1984). Key informants were identified through networking strategies. Their 
potential lor contribution to the research was based on the following criteria: others' 
recognition of their involvement; position within an organisation; access to information; 
expe11isc/expericnce in resource management and/or Ahtlriri Estuary. 
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For pragmatic reasons, the informants were divided into three groups based on ethnicity 
and organisational atliliation. The first group was composed of tango/a lVi1enllCl 
representatives from the Te Wlwnganlli-a-Orol!l and Here/ulIllg" Taiwhel1u({ commiltees, 
members from the Ahllriri Executive Committee, and the New Zealand Maori CounciL 
Also included were the NgC[fi Ka11ll11g11l111 expert witnesses at the Waitangi Tribunal 
hearings. Another group of contributors were the resource management planning and 
policy staff and iwi liaison personal from the Hawke's Bay Regional Council (HBRC), 
Hastings District Council (HDC), Napier City Council (NCC), and Department of 
Conservation (DoC). These agencies have statutory obligations for the management of Te 
Wlwngal1ui-a-Oro/uIAlllIriri Estuary and had formed a joint committee to produce a 
management plan l'or Te WlwngwllIi-a-OroluIAlllIriri Estuary in 1992. The third group 
consisted of in/'ol'mants from the Ahuriri Protection Society and the Hawke's Bay Fish and 
Game Council, who have an environmental interest in the management of Te Wlwllga/1l1i-a-
OrollIlAhliriri Estuary. 
The field-work was carried out during two trips to Napier. The first visit was t!'01ll 
December 1993 to January 1994, the second in April 1994. The first visit included 
attending a Waitangi Tribunal hearing (II 14 December 1993) on Te Whal7gal7ui-a-
OrolulAhuriri Estuary. This hearing included a tleld trip to O/a/ara pel al the original 
south-western end of Te Whcwgal7l1i-a-Oro(lI. 111 January 1994 I visiled the Waitangi 
Tribunal offices in Wellington to search the case documents. This provided a fuller picture 
or the customary use of Te Whul1gCll1ui-a-O,.otuIAhur;r; Estuary, the history of the estuary, 
and what Te Whal1gal1l1i-a-Oro(uIAhuriri Estuary means to Ngali Kahungul111. During this 
trip I interviewed Ngati Kahungul1u infonnants, Waitangi Tribunal members and the 
claimanls' expert wilnesses. 
I lIsed the Herald Trihlll/e (Hastings) and Dai(v Telegraph (Napier) newspapers as other 
sources of int'ormation. The articles and letters to the editor in regard to Treaty claims or 
AIIlI,.iri Estuary published at the time of my field work revealed some common perceptions 
about Milori and their claims. Past editions of the Kalnmgul111 iwi newspaper provided 
particular Maori points of view. The Ahuriri Estuaf:v Draft Management Plan -
Submissions Summw:v (February 1993) was also used to identify the range of concerns and 
the reactions of various community sectors that had an interest in Te Whanganui-a-
OrotulAhuriri Estuary. Environmental concerns were identified from the inforn1ation held 
at the Environment Centre in Napier. The period between the two visits was spent on 
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preliminary analysis and developing interview questions which would clarify the data given 
by Ngt7li Kallllllg1ll1li and provide a basis for interviewing LA staff. 
During the second trip I attended a HBRC Maori Committee meeting to observe the 
council's relationship with Ng£7fi Kahul1glll1l1. The field-work concluded with observing 
a IlIIi at Tal/goio murae which discussed the Charter between the HBRC and their Maori 
committee. These observations clarified the HBRC's interaction with Ngiiti Kahllllgul1l1. 
A local historian showed me historical photographic material during a guided tour of the 
original estuary adjacent to Poraifi. This provided further insight into the history and Ngtlti 
Kallllnglll111 settlement or Te Wllllllgal1ui-a-OrofllIAlwriri Estuary. During this second trip 
I concentrated on interviewing the planners and policy makers and iwi liaison stalT of lhe 
LAs associated with WlulI1ganlli-a-Orotli/Ahliriri Estuary, and re-interviewing some 
Ng£7fi Kahlll1gllllll informants. Both field trips included observing the activities of people 
at Te Whallgal/ui-a-OrolllIAllllriri Estuary. I used a diary to record events, thoughts, 
observations. information. and names, which helped my recall when I started the writing-up 
phase of my research. 
During the interviews I lIsed an interview schedule (Appendix Six) as a framework and 
then followed up the lines of enquiry as they arose. The initial questions were developed 
frol11 issues raised in the A/wriri Draft Management Plan and the Waitangi Tribunal 
hearing. The themes, discussed in later chapters, arose from responses to the interview 
questions. Often the first interview with a Maori infol111ant was not recorded on audio 
tape. This helped to build a rapport with the infonnant. Most P{7keha informants preierred 
to have one meeting that included the account and an interview recorded on audio tape. 
Interviews were from one to four hours long. 
I began transcribing the tapes in the field and completed this by late July 1994. This was 
time consllming but it provided another opportunity to become intimate with the data, and 
to 'relive' the interview. To ensure confidentiality I encoded all names and used tile pass~ 
words. NUDIST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and Theorising) 
sortware was lIsed for analysing the document and interview data. This software made data 
management and manipUlation easier. The text search facility was used to provided data 
1'01' the preliminary conceptual categories from which the themes of 'spirituality', 'property' 
and 'mona/sovereignty' emerged. 
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4.3 Overcoming Research Problems 
During the casc-study I encountered several problems. The most important related to the 
ongoing debate within social science about "who ought to research whom" (Te Awekotuku, 
1991; Teariki, Spoonley, with TOl1loana, 1992; Jackson, \993; MCCombs, 1993). This 
debate relates to intellectual property rights. Ngc7ti KalnmguJ7u are otten inadequately 
resourced and their representatives are over-worked by consultation and research demands 
without the benetll of tangible outcomes (Kerins, 1992; Teariki, 1992; Waaka, 1993). 
Ngl7ti Kahul1gu17l1 wariness of research meant that 1 had to consult carefully and clearly 
define my role as a researcher. Having gained informed consent from Ngati KahungUI1Ll, 
the issue was resolved in this case, but another potential problem then arose, that of being 
co-opted into 'advocacy research' on behalf of Ng(/ti KahuJ1glll1l1 (Drake, 19H9). 
mitigated this problem by ensuring that [ maintained access to all groups associated with 
AllllJ'iri Estuary. 
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Part Three: Results and Discussion 
Part Three is divided into four chapters. Chapters Five, Six and Seven discllss the results 
and Chapter Eight, as a concluding chapter, presents a bi-cultural 'joint management 
model'. The discussion explores major themes arising from the data. These themes are: 
the difference in paradigms from which M((o/'i and Pdkelui values are derived (Chapter 5): 
the management and use of common property/resources (Chapter 6); and the issue of 
sovereignly (Chapter 7). 
In the past environmental planning focused on land use classilication, minimising the 
cullural aspects of resource munagement (Mcmon et aI., 1993). The RMA tends to echo 
the Town (Ind COlln/I:1' Phll1l1il1g Act 1977 by defining the environment in bio-physical 
terms: land, water, air, soil, and ecosystems. However, the governing principles found in 
Sections 6(e). 7(a), 8, (see Appendix Five) and the Third Schedule WaleI' QlIalizv Class C 
or the RMA potentially accord a unique position to tangota wi1el1l1(f in regard to the 
management of /(Ionga/natural resources. This may provide for /ikanga Maori to be 
accollllllodated in /(lollga/nalural resource management, a point developed further in 
Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Five: 
Miiori Spirituality and Secular Western Paradigms 
5.0 Introduction 
The data presented in this chapter show a fundamental difference between the way Maori 
and Pcikelul perceive, and therefore relate to, t(fol1galnatural resources given their different 
cullural paradigms. The interviews [ conducted support an interpretation that this hinders 
the acceptance or the validity of tikanga Maori by councils. 
Earl. Tile councils talk hureaucratic and agendas. lind the M{iori people 
talk ahout consultatio/1 and the wahi tapu and the ,\piritual elements, 
and they go whoosh (gesllIres hands passing hy e((ch other). 
Communication between tangata 'whel1l1(/ and LAs is affected by philosophical differences 
between P(lkelul and Maori. [n this chapter I will first explain what is meant by 
paradigms. I will then present the data that show differences between fikanga Miiori and 
Western paradigms. I will outline the antecedence of cartesian dualism that dominates the 
Western paradigm and show how cultural paradigms bear upon the RMAs implementation. 
Paradigms are collective conceptual frameworks for explaining the cosmos and how it 
functions. Paradigms have also been described as cllltllral.fi/t(!rs (Jeuns, 1974 cited in 
Pepper, 1984) (Figure 3), because they are the ways of thinking that seem natural and 
certain within a particular culture. Paradigms shape how a society's members perceive and 
relate to the natural environment. Truth and reality are defined within the limits of a 
cultural paradigm. 
Ii II Cultural 
II II Filter 
II II 
II The I II II 
II ENVIRONMENT I II Percei ved SOCIETY 
II I II En vi ronmen t II 
II I II II 
II II 
II World 
View 
Figure 3 How 'Cultural Filters' influence perceptions (adapted from Jeans, J 974) 
24 
Paradigms may change from time to time within a society. When this change occurs it is 
referred to as a paradigm shift (Rainbow, 1993). Rebuilding a cultural fIlter establishes a 
new paradigm by which to assess knowledge about the cosmos. Differences between the 
pakehil and Milori paradigms are evident in the values ascribed to, and knowledge about, 
loonga/natural resources. The conflicting 'ways of knowing' became evident during the 
interviews I conducted. The theme of spirituality was prominent. 
5.1 The Piikehii Respondents' Paradigm 
This section presents the views expressed by pak<:'/ui LA staff and environmental group 
members who had a preference for using Western scientific knowledge and methods to 
manage /aol1gu/natural resources, Environmental interest group respondents, who wanted 
T<:' Whollgalllli-a-Orolu/ A/wl'i!'; Estuary protected, tended to focus on issues of resource 
control, pollution, public access and habitat protection. They assumed that lallgata whenua 
also wanted to protect the resource, so they saw little difference between themselves and 
Mc/ori in cultural values associated with Te Whal1ganllf-a-OroIl/IA/IltJ'iri Estuary. 
Jane. The iwi a/so wallts 10 see it preserl'<:,d. So our cliitural 
p<:'!'ceptiol1s (1/'<:'/1 'I vel)! d(fjfl'ellt. We helfew it should he a 
shal'(;,£! J'<:'soll!'ce Opf!/I to all. 
Some informants understood that thel'e was a clear difference in cultural values associated 
with Te W/wnganuf-a-Ol'otuIAhuriri Estuary. Adam explained how Western culture 
separates the physical and the spiritual. 
• ... we've actllalzv taken that Descal'lian pathway tvhich separates head and heart ... spiritual element. Some people might feel mol'<:' 
con~fbl'tahle wilh the term aesth<:'tic. 
Adam went on to say that there was a conflict between intrinsic values and science, and 
that scientists are not expected to hold to spiritual values. 
They [scientistsj are not allowed to say those things (.'pil'itllalj. 
A DoC manager clearly saw that the concept of intrinsic values was a gUIse for 
anthropocentrism, This meant that people, even if they try to be 'eco-centric" are in the 
tinul analysis still centred on themselves, 
Doug. Il1evitab~v OI1C<:' it's [intrinsic valuej defined by people, ... we 
like to think thaI we are coming/hJl11 all eco-centric point of 
view in saying it, ... it sOllnds anthropocentric. 
25 
Doug also understood that he was operating within a Western paradigm that separated 
people from the natural world: 
• /'/11 coming ,/i'OI71 (/ Pt7kehii vallie hase.... people sepaJ'{[ling 
themselves ,/i'0111 nature und saying nature is there for us to lise. 
Mike shared this point of view 
• / mean it 's jillula11lel1ta/~)I part or their (Maori/ cllltltre and their 
tradiliolls. I think as Pc7kelu7 we Icmd 10 view the envil'Ollment (/S 
something {Ii.~ioint.fi·()m ourselves. Whereas my understanding of the 
Miiori cU/lural 1{'(Ie/ilions is Ihat iI's vel:1' much apart or their whole 
heing. Therejore that's 'vvhy it 's so important to not desecrate those 
tool1ga, righl. So thaI's why human sewerage into the sea is a no 
no, even though you treat it and you can prohahzv drink it, YOIl still 
shollldll't put it illlo the sea because of that. That sort or almost 
desecratioll (?i'that relatifmship. SO I11,V impression is that they velY 
much view themselves as parI q/ that environment as opposed to 
P£7ke/nl who see themselves living In the environment. ThaI's Ihe 
dUj'erence. 
Doug believed that members of his department best understood tuollgulnatural resource 
management because of their scientific work. So their responsibility was to inform Mc70ri 
about good resource management practices . 
• ... Ihe Crown mllst inj'orm IGllgala whelllla .... we have scient isIs .. , we 
s/rolildn't keep a/lllial knowledge to ourselves. 
The preference for resource management to be based on Western science was prevalent 
amongst Pc Ike lUI respondents. Western science was seen as the only valid way in which 
to manage taonga/natural resources. 
Gary. 
Mike II 
{TJlle main thing is making sure thaI the resource is 
preserved... scienl ijic evidence 10 slipporl anv rules and 
regulatiolls. 
So when processing a resources consent (I there's obvious 
impacts on iwi cultural values Ihat are heing dearZI J 
articulated.... BUI al the end q( the day It c/oesn't have 
preeminence ... , Because 011 Ihe other hand YOli have readlZv 
quanti/iable scient!fic and environmental impacts. 
Doug put it this way: 
• .. ,Ihere is a deep spiritual side of Miioricioll1 thaI is c1ea/'(v not part 
oj' a Pcikeha, 
Nominal spiritual values, anthropoeentrism and Western scientific methods which are part 
of the Pc7kehii respondents' paradigm will be described as the 'Secular Western Paradigm', 
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5.2 The Nf?iiti Kahungullu Respondents' Paradigm 
Most Ngiiti Kalwngllllll respondents spoke about taoJ1ga/natural resources in a relational 
and spiritual way. in their world view the physical elements are inseparable from the 
spiritual dimcnsion. As explaincd by Fred: 
• / 'm talkillg aholll Maori perceplioll, you have one God, the creator. Then YOII have yourfather RCll1ginui. This is a uiliversaljclfher. the 
all inclusive realm (~/the Ilnseen. You dOll 'I see the father, you/eel 
him in the wind, yo/( feel him in Ihe vvul'mlh (?/Ihe SUI1 .... Then you 
have your mother, that IS Papat17cil1uku, who provides eve,:v earth~v 
material, lhings you can see unci/eel. you can eal alld touch, even 
desecrate .... 
So, for this respondent, to know reality is to experience the spiritual realm contained within 
the environment. 
• ... ol1e miist hecome immersed in nalure to/ind the answers .... '(/1 'm 
10 know what the land is sayillg to me / l17/(st go 10 Ihe land ' .... hey 
thaI's Ihe lVairua you can 'I suppress llial ... hUI Ihat '.'I alien to a lot 
or pakelul, 
The philosophical basis of the Ngciti Kalllll1gullu paradigm is founded on the concepts of 
tikanga and ll/ol7ga (HBRe, Regional Poliq Statement. 1994). Tikal7ga is comprised of 
three 'kits' of knowledge, which are essential to understanding Ngclti Kahungul7u 
cosmology. The lirst kit, /17c/tCluranga, is the scientific knowledge of humanity and natural 
phenomena. The second kit, wha/airo, is comprised of the information about Ngiili 
Kahlll1gul1l1 origins and their place in the cosmos (w/wkapapa). These two kits make up 
the notion of tikanga, contained in the third kit. This kit consists of the rituals and customs 
that accompany actions/events to ensure spiritual blessing from attla, the Ngci/i Kahungullu 
customs that detel111ine the structure of Ngiiti Kallllngul1l1 society and decision-making 
processes for using taonga/natural resources. hvi trace their 'Yvlwkapapa from atl/a, through 
fll/)UflCI, who are embodied in the features of the natural world, (rivers, mountains) that the 
iwi inhabits. So their identity is with the mountain and river of the place of their 
habitation, their IOrangawaewae. This provides a continuity of the past into the rresent 
(Barlow, 1994). Alan explained that all this provides a spiritual imperative for the wise 
use of taol7ga. 
• For the harvesting (ial! species there was the appropriate tik.anga. 
In likanga Mc70ri the concepts of mauri and wlwkapapa are fundamental and appear to 
have no equivalent in the Secular Western Paradigm (henceforth, SWP). 
III the tmditionullvhiori view. evelything in the natural world possess mauri 
(tile physical lite force) which is IJrotected hy kaitiaki (spirit guardiall) or 
atllll (deity). Ilumans I}(JS.W:SS mal/riora. which is (?l a higher order then of' 
malll'i hut cOI?f'ers Oil humans a certain respollsihili(l' towards other living 
thillgs. Preservatiol1 q( the maud of' any element of the natural world is 
essential/or slIrvival (Manatii Mdori, 1991). 
27 
This is manifest in how Ngcili Kahu/1gul1u relate to the natural world as kaitiaki. Ng(/ti 
Kaillingul1l1 see their responsibility as kaitiakitanga for Te Whangal1l1i-a-OroluIAhul'iri 
Estuary involving more than maintaining utilitarian or intrinsic values. Thus kailiakitanga 
is a spiritual act expressed through wOl1galresource lise and protection. Furthemlore, each 
taonga has its own protective spiritual guardian, who will warn the people to correct any 
inappropriate treatment of tuol1ga. 
Modem European views of'the llatl/ral world and natural resources are 
essenlial(v scienl(/Ic. For the pllrpO,I,'e of'SfliC(V and research scienlisls divide 
the whole il1to its component parts and class(f.i· the parts. In other words 
they do not share the Maori (sic) view of unity (d' people (lnd the treasures 
they proc/uce with the land and the cosmos. Nor do tlwy share the Maori 
(sic) view that "Names, knowledge. ancestors, treasures, and the land are 
so closelv intertwined. .. that thev should l1ever he separated" (Te ROl'Oa 
. . 
Waitangi Tribunal report, Wai 38:211), 
In the relationship between people and the environment, people are to be responsible 
caretakers of tuongo/natural resources in respect for Atl/a and lupW7CI, Mc7ol'i, as Imifiaki, 
are to lise and sustain the laonga, gifted to the people by the Atl/a, for current needs and 
for future generations (Waitangi Tribuna\, 1988). Therefore the Ngtiti Kalllll1gul1u paradigm 
is cognisant of an inherent spirituality in all (aongalnatural resources. TikCll1ga Mclori 
places the value or taonga outside of human ascription, it is 10 (supreme God creator) who 
has determined the value because the gift is the work of his hands, It would be 
sacrilegious to SpU111 such a gift by abusing it, or to devalue it, because this would be an 
offense against atl/a and lupuna. Ngc7ti Kahungllllll responsibility as kaitiakilanga for Te 
Whangal1l1i-a-OrotllIAhuriri Estuary cannot be negated by secular methods of resource 
management. For Ngciti Kahunglll1u, the pollution and degradation of Te Whangal1ui-a-
Ol'OflIlAllllriri Estuary is not just about the loss of species and demise of an ecosystem but 
the insult and abuse of their tupun(( and loss of mahinga kai. This has reduced their mw1Cl 
also, That is why Te Whanganlli-a-OroluIAhuriri Estuary is more than just an estuary to 
the Ngcili Kahungul7l1 hapa who are langata whenua. The following part of the waiata (pre 
1840) of the Ngciti Maim ancestress Te Whata expresses the value Ngciti Kallllllgunu place 
on Te Whangal1l1i as a mahinga kai. 
"Kia 1101'0 te /were 
Nga taumata ki Te Poraiti 
Ko te kainga i pepehatia 0 
tip una 
He kainga to te ata 
He /cainga lea awatea 
He kainga lea ahiahi .... " 
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'Go quickZV to the heights at Te Poraiti 
That is the land in a proverb 0/ our 
ancestors 
The store house that never closed 
Te Whanga 
A meal in the morning 
A meal in the qjternool1 
A meal in the evening' 
(R H Hiha, Kaumatua) 
The relationship of Ngiifi Kahungunu to Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary is also 
shown in the carved totems (Figure 4) that are located within Te Whangamd-a-
OrotulAhuriri Estuary. 
Figure 4 Carvings at Te Whanganui-a-Orotu 
(Photograph by M H Palmers). 
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The contrast between the two sets of respondents' paradigms led me to consider the 
antecedence of the SWP. Rather than being dichotomous, the two paradigms are at 
different points on the sacred/secular continuum. In AOlearoa/New Zealand the point at 
which people are at on the sacred/secular continuum differs both inter and intra culturally 
(Pyle, 1992; James, 1993). The SWP influenced the settler's perceptions of both 
taonga/natural resources and indigenous peoples, more than any specific treaty. 
5.3 Foundations of the Secular Western Paradigm 
To follow a chronological order, Greek thought will be discussed first. Greek thought 
infl uellced Western thinking during the 15-181h century era of the Renaissance, Refomlation 
and Enlightenment, an era which culminated in a secular-materialist paradigm (Schumacher, 
1973 and Capra, 1983 in Pepper, 1984; Bames, 1985). This world view provided a 
rationale for the processes of industrialisation and colonisation. (The Church's culpability 
in resource exploitation and the colonisation of AOlearoa/New Zealand will also be 
considered. ) 
5.3.1 Greek Thought about Matter and Spirituality 
In Greek thought, the material (body and matter) is separate and independent of the 
spiritual (if indeed it existed). This position is called 'dualism' and is expressed in a 
number of ways. First, much of Greek philosophy saw the material as evil and the spiritual 
as pure (Luce, 1989). The terrestrial and temporal was constrained to this life, and being 
seen as evil it was of no eternal or spiritual significance (Thomas, 1984). Secondly, if 
immortality existed it was not connected to physical matter (Luce, 1989), Thirdly, some 
Greek philosophers argued thai only matter existed, so neither gods or a spiritual dimension 
to the cosmos existed. They considered the mind/soul to be matter also, thus circumventing 
the whole dualistic argument about the division of matter and SPirit (Lucc, 1989). 
The work of the Greek philosopher Socrates (470-399 B.c.) focused on human conduct and 
ethics and marked a turning point in Greek thought. A focus on another world, through 
the inner (spiritual) life, became important. Here dualism is found in pursuing after~life 
rewards separate from this physical world. Splitting the spiritual and the material worlds 
in this way provides the undelvinnings of scientific enquiry, which concerns itself with the 
physical world alone (ihid.). 
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Another Greek philosopher, Epicurus (342-270 B.C.), emphasised the senses and reason as 
the basis for obtaining knowledge and organising experiences. Epicurus based his 
philosophy on the atomist' view of the world (Luce, 1989). Here is the basis of what has 
been declared as the 'objectivity' of science: a science based on observation which can be 
understood through reason (Barnes, 1985). From dualistic philosophy emerged the idea that 
observation and experience (including experiments) can be used to understand the whole 
cosmos. The Cartesian/Newtonian scientific method follows this tradition. Only things 
which can be shown to exist are real and exist (Sorell, 1987). As already indicated, Greek 
thinking influenced the philosophers, of the Renaissance (1 16th Centuries) and 
Enlightenment (181h Century) periods (Lacey, 1982). 
5.3.2 The Western Renaissance and Enlightenment 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) denounced Greek philosophy because he argued that it had 
corrupted Christian thought. Yet Bacon criticised the Church's suspicions of advances in 
knowledge, because this hindered scientific endeavours (Farrington. 1964). His driving 
concern was for the welfare of humanity and its relief from poverty (Farrington, 1964). 
Advocating a quest for knowledge that was independent of religion has profoundly artected 
Westem history (Barnes, 1985). In England, the philosophers of the Enlightenment period 
tended to rely more on the use of the senses rather than intuition, and so promoted 
empiricism (Gilmour, 1989). Empiricist explanations and 'scientific objectivity' replaced 
spiritual understandings of how the cosmos functioned. It was Bacon's contemporary, 
Descartes, who utilised his critique of religious control to change the course of Western 
thinking. 
Descartes (1596-1650) is considered the father of modem Western philosophy because he 
... tried to sholl' that scient(/ic knowledge of the physical world 
depended on the existence (?l a mind or soul distinct Ji'om the body 
(Sorell, 19R7:37). 
Descartes comprehended three ways of knowing: intuition, sense perception, and reason. 
He promoted a scientific methodology that relied on intuition and reason rather than the 
senses. He thought that senses originated in the mind (Sorell, 1987), because he 
understood that if the mind/soul were separate from the world we could discern the truth 
I A view in which the universe, as a material world. is a mechanical sYiltem from which the gnus arc 
totally uetached. 
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about the objective natural world. This 'rationalist' approach was followed on the 
European continent and was encapsulated in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) a Gennan philosopher espoused a materialist view of the 
world. Nietzsche argued that to think otherwise was to be deluded and irrational. 
God Wh0111 J created was human work and human madness. like all 
gods.' A man was he and on~v a poor /i'agment (~( man and ego. 
Qut of mine own ashes and glow it came unto me. that phantom 
(Nietzsche, translated by COlllmon, n.d.). 
Nietzsche's materialist philosophy arose frolll Greek thought, and the existential philosophy 
of Descartes. Nietzsche's concern about the devaluing of the physical world by focusing 
on a spiritual dimension is a two-edged sword. The first edge, which he clearly saw, is an 
emphasis on a spiritual future which devalues the present world in hope of a new paradise. 
The physical world is treated with contempt, being something to struggle against and 
conquer (Thomas, 1984). Or, alternately, the physical world is seen as a cosmic accident. 
This view lacks a sense of awe for the natural world and alienates the physical from the 
spiritual. For some, this involves a denial of the existence of a spiritual world (Thomas, 
1984; Barnes, 1985; Fox, 1990). So the natural world could only be defined and 
understood in materialistic and mechanistic terms on the basis of scientific knowledge 
(Barnes, 1985). Pyle (1992) also adds that the 'reductionist' approach separated people 
from nature and focused on utility values in nature. With respect to environmental values 
this paradigm shift, based on the success of the scientific method and the need to improve 
living conditions (Barnes, 1985), exacerbated the exploitation of taonga/natural resources 
(Thomas, 1984). 
Pepper (1984) also identifies factors from the 19th century that account for anti-
environmental values. These arc: the Evolution rationale which provided concepts of 
competition, natural selection and survival of the fittest (justifying eugenics and calling 
non-European peoples primitive); the Marxist belief in the material ist base of history (the 
accumulation of capital which devalued the natural world, not a spiritual insensibility) 
(Thomas, 1984); the Freudian psychological emphasis on the il1dividual which reduced the 
sense or community and collective responsibility (Fox, 1990); and the pre-eminence of a 
Scient(jic Philosophy that 'valid' knowledge can be attained only through the scientific 
method within the Cartesian/Newtonian paradigm. The next section shows how this was 
encapsulated in the impact of the industrial revolution (Barnes, 1985). 
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5.4 Industrialisation, Resource Exploitation and the Church 
Western economic systems, in conjunction with the industrial revolution and the 
development of new political systems, reinforced a lack of concern for the environment 
(Fox, 1990; Tisdell, 1990). Bacon's utilitarian view of the natural world, and the 
effectiveness of Western science and technology, meant that the exploitation of 
laonga/natural resources became nonnative for improving living standards. The 'wild and 
waste' places. were to be tamed, ruled over and made useful to humanity (Thomas, 1984). 
The Western Church, as a pat1 of the Westem culture, believed that it was reestablishing 
God's order over the 'fallen creation' (Thomas, 1984; Fox, 1990). The Church was also 
influenced by the ethnocentric superiority (Hackshaw, 1989) of Westem science and 
theology (Bosch, 1991) over other cultures (Thomas, 1984), having been captured by the 
'spirit of the age' (Cockshut, 1964). Subsequently the church has been criticised for its 
part in Western colonisation and its indifference to the natural world (White, 1973; Fricker, 
1994). 
The Church's control of knowledge was a major concern of both Bacon (Farrington, 1964) 
and Descartes (Sorell, 1987). They wanted scientific endeavour to provide an independent 
understanding of the world, beyond the interference of the Church (Barnes, 1985). 
Consequently the influence of the Church declined in regard to science and industry, as did 
the perceived relevance of the spiritual values that it held (Barnes, 1985). For these 
reasons .ludaeo-Christianity had a limited influence (ibid.) in the SWP and did not provide 
an effective alternative for managing taonga/natural resources, or colonisation. Thus to 
place all the blame at the Church's door would be to overstate the case against Christianity 
(Pepper, 1984; Thomas, 1984). 
One aspect of Judaeo-Christian thought, I ike Ngdti Kahungul1l1, saw natural resources as 
gifts from a creator God to be looked after (stewardship), rejecting the Greek and 
Descartian view or a mechanistic world (Thomas, 1984; Pyle, 1992). Such stewardship was 
not fostered by Western society (Daly, 1980; Tisdell, 1990). The result is a tension 
between Western knowledge and indigenous knowledge about the world (Berkes, \989). 
No thought was given to the spiritual values of other cultures, as will be seen in the 
concerns voiced by the Church Missionary Society with regard to the colonisation of 
AolearoClINew Zealand. 
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5.5 Christianity and the Colonisation of AotearoalNew Zealand 
The tirst experience of Christianity by Maori came via European whalers, sealers and 
traders before the end of the 181h century (Henare, 1992). Consequently, when the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) sent missionaries to AOlearoafNew Zealand, some hopllliwi had 
some experience of Christianity. Whilst the CMS promulgated the Christian gospel, it 
feared that colonisation would have a major negative effect on Mclori (Davidson and 
Lineham 1987; Glen, 1992). These concems were communicated to the British Crown but 
there was no effective response (Binney, 1990). 
Trade, opportunities, poor living conditions and unemployment resulting from economic 
depression in the United Kingdom, became significant push factors for colonising 
AOlearoalNew Zealand (per."!. com., MCAloon, 1995). Missionaries were perceived by 
settlers and M{iori to provide a stabilising influence. Hapll sought prestige by having their 
own missionary in residence (Binney, 1990; Glen, 1992). They presumed that through such 
arrangements, trade would prosper and a common law would be administered which would 
control the activities of the settlers (Binney, 1990). Maori understood there to be an 
operational association between English laws and the settlers' beliefs, that is, the Christian 
faith as taught by the missionaries (Henare, 1992). The settlers expected the civilisation 
and assimilation of native peoples to smooth the path for their own economic ends. Thus 
the Church became a cog in the colonial machine despite some missionary protest (Glen, 
1992; Davidson, 1(87). Colonial paternalism and Euro-centric perception of reality also 
infused the Church. There were few attempts to understand the world view of other 
peoples since they were described as pagan and in need of civilising (Henare, 1992). In 
due time the Church was dominated by settlers, and this alienated Maori converts (ihid.). 
The SWP, England's industrialisation and advanced technology and the colonisation of 
AOlearoalNew Zealand with the use of anTIed force, all exacerbated the exploitation of 
langola whemw and their resources. Despite this, the missionaries have left a significant 
legacy, Te Tirili 0 Wailal1gi. The Treaty requires an understanding of tikanga Maori if 
there is to be an effective partnership in laongalnatural resource management. The 
partnership is affected by the interpretation and implementation of the RMA. 
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5.6 Paradigms and the Resource Management Act 1991 
A society's dominant paradigm detern1ines which culture's 'science' will be considered 
valid. This is a core issue in attempting to integrate Western resource management science 
with traditional Ngati Kahul1gul1u tikanga. Fred used the following metaphor to illustrate 
that YOll can not just merge two very different paradigms 
• YOII 've got the assumption that you can have an apricot tree and an 
apple tree and you chop them il1 hall and glue 'em together and 
slick 'em in the ground (/nd they '1/ bearfhlit. 
Yet the RMA gives cultural values a legal precedence (Treadwell, 1994). This precedence 
is seen to be important in helping to change attitudes toward other cultures. 
Earl • 'Hey who cares ahout this group [Maori]. They're just another 
group in the communi!;v'. There is still some (~l that attilude but it 
is tempered 'never-the-Iess the law says '. People say 'hey the law 
can't change attitudes', it can. The law makes il respectahle to 
comp~v 'we have to do it'. 
Earl went on to say that the LA staff operate judiciously according to the political climate 
and the law. 
• /t's the political climate. All it requires is a lawyer to say 'look / 
represent the tangata \;vhenua they have l10t heenfidly consulted 011 
this', and yo/( can't prodllce evidence, YOll're shot!. 
Yet Earl also talked about the hegemony of the status quo and said that; 
• The hig divide is between sta.frpolh~v planners and our councillors. 
Our couneil/(m. are on average somewhat over 60 years old, white, 
male, middle class and it is dUlleult f(U O many of them to come to 
terms with it [Mliol'i values). 
This was reiterated by Ray, who said that recognition of the Treaty affects the law, so that 
in time the dominant paradigm is challenged . 
• ... to he honest it's really' OI1ZV theOlTat this stage. you have to 
recognise that there are dffF:!rent cultural and spiritual values 
associated to that land. And the Treaty is making us recognise 
that .... one dominant philosophy/or the lise (~f'land we're having to 
go awayfhnn .... the Treaty has come through the RMA milch more 
strongly than in the Town and Counll:V Planning Act .... The nature 
q( paradigms shifis .... a df/Jerent world view, and it takes time to 
hecome accepted. 
Never the less Ray also had a preference for the Western paradigm. 
• . .. the rationale that we lise/or sustainable management is the same/or one 
clIltural group potential(v as it is fbr another. fl the whole concept (~t' 
sustainable management i.)' tIffects based. 
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The physical effects of resource use are more generally measurable, often visible, and 
therefore potentially quantifiable. These tend to over-ride the consideration or nOI1-
measurable, 'meta physical', impacts, even though the RMA specifically includes cultural 
values as an important component in the sustainable management of taonga/natural 
resources. As argued, spiritual values are important to Ngati Kahungul1u but often were 
seen as been peripheral to 'real' taonga/natural resource management 
Earl • ... spiritllali~JI, hey you know, warm /irzzies we can cope with that. 
The issues of kaitiakitanga, 'wahl tapu, are therefore reduced to a mere 'cultural 
metaphysical' component of resource management. In this way the SWP does not 
accommodate tikanga /v1£7ori (Kirkwood, 1993). Resource management is 
el'entllal(v driven back to basic philosophy or philosophies in our 
attempt to grapple 'with resource issues .... policy prescriptions are 
hased IIpon general philosophical preconceptions (Tisdell, 
1990: 162). 
In this case study, the 'general philosophical preconceptions' (Tisdell, 1990) of respondent 
groups (Ngc7ti Kahungllnll, LAs and Crown resource managers, and environmental interest 
groups) about the management of toonga/natural resources, reflected cultural 
secular/spiritual differences. The Cartesian separation of the spiritual and the secular, 
intrinsic to the SWP but never to tikal1ga Maori, has perpetuated the misunderstanding 
between Maori and pake/ul as to what taongalnatural resources are and thus how they 
ought to be cared for (Shearer, 19R6). The 'sacred/secular dichotomy is foreign to Maori 
thinking and indeed it has been vigorously challenged' (Williams, 1989:79). 
For Ngati Kalilll1glll111, unlike Nietzsche, the origin of the physical is perceived to be in the 
spiritual. That is, /0 does not exist because of people, but rather people exist because of 
/0. For Ngciti Ka/llI11gUI1I1, the spiritual world has an active expression in the material 
world and both can be experienced by people (Best, 1982). The spiritual is no less known 
than the physical elements that surround us (Mol1atu Maori, 1991; Barlow, 1994). The 
Mciori view of the cosmos could be defined as 'dualistic' in that it is cognisimt of both the 
material and the spiritual elements (Schrempp, 1992). This dualism is expressed in 
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Miiorifanga as the concept of mal/rio Mauri is the life essence in all created beings, rocks, 
water, plants, animals and people (Barlow, 1994). The essence of life comes from 10. At 
death mauri, which binds the spiritual to the physical, leaves the physical being and returns 
to the spiritual realm from where it originated (Barlow, 1994). Since !11auri imbues all 
beings, this is what is affected through inappropriate and deleterious use of natural 
resources. Therefore, whilst Cartesian dualism treats the physical and spiritual as being 
mutually exclusive, M{iori dualism is cognisant of a unity between the physical and 
spiritual. This does not fit the SWP. 
5.7 Conclusion 
It has been shown that LAs and Ngiiti Kahungul1l1 have different cultural filters through 
which they perceive Te Whangal111i-a-Orotu/Ahuriri Estuary. Pc7kehii resource managers 
rely upon Western science and tend to be dismissive of Ng{iti Kahungl111l1 spiritual values. 
Environmental groups also tend towards Western resource management practices. The 
materialist secular world view has been dominant in the Westem system of taonga/natural 
resource management (Shearer, 1986; Kenchington, 1990), but there are indications of a 
tentative change to this approach to faonga/natural resource management. Perhaps these 
are the beginnings of a paradigm shift. For some, e.g., Rainbow (1993) a paradigm shift 
is implicit in the RMA, with its requirement to consider cultural values. 
The next chapter will consider how cultural paradigms influence perceptions of property, 
which also affect how the RMA is implemented. 
Ol/e (d'the 111qjOl' issues in common property resources is how to 
integrate scient{fic management with traditional knowledge and 
management (Berkes 1989:89). 
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Chapter Six: 
Property Rights and Common Resources 
6.0 Introduction 
In Chapter Five I discussed the concept that taonga/natural resources are seen through 
cultural filters. For Ngliti Kahullgunu spiritual elements infuse all taonga/natural resources, 
but the SWP foregoes any such infusion. I will now focus on another significant theme 
to arise from the data, how culture also structures property rights. 
J will use evidence from the data to present a Piikehii understanding of common resource 
lise rights. These make lip part of the SWP. Ngclti Kahungul1u believe that there are 
responsibilities associated with any 'right' to use common resources. After defining 
common resource regimes, I will focus on the potential of the RMA to take into account 
the use of non-Western common resource regimes, like that of the Ngiiti Kahungunu 
system, for resource allocation and use. 
6.1 The Secular Western Paradigm and Common Resource Regimes 
A common view amongst Plikehii informants was that areas of open space and of 
significant ecological importance, like Te Whanganui-a-Ol'Otu/Ahuriri Estuary, were there 
for all citizens to use and enjoy. There was an underlying theme that common resources 
wcre for the common good and should be managed under one law. This could be seen as 
the rationale for thc Crown and LAs to own, manage and therefore control common 
resource lise, like those found in Te Whanganui-a-Orotu/Ahul'il'i Estuary. Where private 
property rights do not exist, the resource is considered to be common property. Ptikehti 
informants generally thought that no one had the right to exclude others from access to, or 
use of, a common resource. No one should pay another individual for accessing or using 
common resources. As one informant said 
Gary. Say ([ ./cll'lner had (/ houl1dm~v along a good .fishing river 
UII1 ... he H'ould then he ahle to charge access and .fishing 
rights and all that sort of thing .... that is why there is so 
much talk ahout this 'Queens chain ,I. 
I The 'Queens Chain' is II colloquial term for riparian land in crown ownership or control. usually being 
20 meters wide and allowing for conservation, recreation and access. Esplanade Reserves arc 
administered under the Re.w;I'l'es ACI 1977. Enplanade Strips arc a product or the RMA alid change with 
the shore line (sec the RMA 1991 s('eliol1 229-237) (Milne, 1993), 
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Gary was concerned that there should be continued access which could be guaranteed by 
a 'Queens chain', so that all could enjoy fishing and shooting. He did not think that paying 
for licences was an imposition on these common rights. Rather he saw the fees as a 
resource rental to ensure that there were sufficient funds for the continued management of 
the wildlife resources . 
II ... [Fish & Game Councils} paid the Government levies 10 assistlheil' 
research scientists. 
The wrongness of commercial ising natural resources was also voiced by Jane. 
II there's SOI1U;' things thaI are just beyond and ahove the markel ... 
we've jllst got to look after these natural resources ... not exploit 
Ihemall.yolll11l1stl1.tseedollarsinthemall.VeIYH.rol1g if'we do. 
There were concerns about commercialising natural resources and about the threat of being 
excluded from the use of certain resources. These respondents did not consider that Maori 
had prior claim to the resources. Gary related some anecdotal evidence of people 
relinquishing their catch to local Maori, which he thought was wrong. 
Gary II They said [local Mliol'lj 'they're ollrjishel'ies and that's our 
.fish' and he: had to give themfour.fish you .I,'ee .... Evel:vbody 
should have the right [to .fish}. To be ahle to go deer 
stalking and that. well now they're not allowed on that Maori 
land so ... there's a .fe~1) hard feelings around. 
The general consensus was that the LAs were responsible to manage all common resources 
for the benefit of alL through a common law. 
Jane II Yes, at the: risk (d' being Vel)!, ve/:V controversial I think that 
those claims [Waitangi Tribunal claims} should be 
overridden hy the wider claims .tor the good of the whole (~f' 
the people, evel:vone. (f' it '.I,' of high conservation vallie ... I 
think that the wider good must prevail. 
She did realise that this was not always so easy to do because of earlier Mciori habitation, 
and immediately said that 
• It's I/ot much good/or me to say, 'well the Mc'iori want - they claim 
this, lets give them something else.' That's a vel:" dtflicult situation, 
they may say 'this is our particular burial groundfhl' instance, or 
our sacred place.' Big conflicts. 
The conl1ict intensifies because the traditional resources and ancestral lands of Ngciti 
Kahullg!lllll have been 'lost' into private ownership which, currently, makes them 
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unavailable for returning to Ngati Kahungul1u1• This means that today there is a lack of 
resources over which to negotiate an exchange to settle the Treaty claim. Added to this, 
the view that common resources owned by LAs should be administered by LAs for the 
benefit of everyone (Stone, 1988) also hinders Ngiiti KahuJ1gullu aspirations for ownership 
of the lagoon. In general, the LA staff saw that their mandate to manage comlllon 
resources came through the RMA. 
Mike III Under the law the Crown mVI1 resources, / mean the 
guardians are rea/~)' the regulatol)' authorities who have Ihe 
power to say :vay or nay' as to the use of'those resources, 
The claims by Ngati Kahungul1u for sharing resource regulation and control have given the 
LAs some difficulties because they do not know how to include them. As Mike said 
Mike III ... so it's quite hard for us, as a regulatOlY hoc(l'. to say: 
'Okay we have to manage Ihose resources; but Ihen Ilu!1'e's 
anolher group [Ngiiti Kahul1gul1U} thaI has stewardship over 
Ihem, How do the two meet and mingle and how does il 
/ . . I ,., ,! 
WO/,/i 111 practlca terms:,'. 
One planner did say that the RMA will allow for iwi to have power in the planning process, 
but at present this was not happening. He thought that for iwi to be effectively involved 
they need to have private property rights to legitimise their stake in the resource 
management process. 
Ray III The Act [RMA} allows LIS [LAs} to devolve planning powers down 
to local iwi groups ... The RMA has allowed the development q/lhal 
concept. Whether aUlhorities are close 10 recognising that, or 
hringing themselves to that point, is (Inother matter .... prohahzv best 
heing embodied ill terms of [private] property [rights). 
It seems that the only way (in'espective of what the RMA may allow) that Ng(/ti Kahul1gul1u 
will have an effeclive voice in the management of Te Whanganui-a-Ol'OluIAllllriri Estuary 
is to have private property rights over the land. Ngiiti Kahungul1l1 do not own the Ahuriri 
Estuary resources, their case is reduced by the Crown to one of "interest" and "use" values 
(see Chapter Seven) because common resources are seen as 'public goods'. 
1 
• If the Trealy had been honoured and M'Leun had advised Nglili /(alulI1gul1l1 that British common law 
deemed the bed of the lagoon to be Crown land then it is doubtful that the sale of the land around the 
lagoon would have proceeded. From this common law presumption and the lack of eommltation with 
Nglili Kal1lJIlgtll1/i as to the devciopment of the port and Napier township, with suprorting acts of 
parliament, the wholt: or T{' IVI/(mgallll;-a-(}/'OI!J/Ahurir; Estuary was alienated from its legitimate owners 
(IFai 55), 
.1 An optiol1 for how the Crown and LAs might deal with this is discussed in Chupter Eight. 
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In the SWP there is a tension between the administration of common resources and private 
property rights. This is partly because of the division that separates a person's private 
afTairs from the public arena. Western resource-user rights, based on ownership, are 
founded on individualism which includes the right to private, and transferable, property 
rights detern1ined by market mechanisms (TisdeJl, 1990). Lino Grima and Berkes 
(1989:46) make the point that the individualism inherent in a laisser.faire economic ethos 
arises from thinking that the 'survival of the fittest is normative'. Individualism could also 
be used to j usti fy how one chose to use what they owned. 
Henry. {f'Milo!'i own the land and that is hmv Ihey want 10 use it. 
how c(ln you intercede in that. It's their business, I think. 
Mike also acknowledged that mUltiple ownership of land resources created problems 
because it did not fit with the individualism that is associated with property rights. 
• The multiple ownership {~l Maori land means iI's velY hard to 
generate the resources to manage land sustainabZl'.... (Also] to sell 
it. orjllst lease it, that's quite a complicated process.... It tends to 
he under ut.ilised and therefore its 170t generating the revenue Ihat 
can then be reinvested (n the resource. 
Resource access and allocation often are an integral part of the Western economic mi lieu 
with the market determining the current utility worth of each resource. The institutional 
aJTangement of priVate property rights protects the individual's pecuniary advantages in the 
access to, and use of a resource, by excluding others from that resource. This solution 
arises because it seems that the only way, in the SWP, to reconcile Ngiili Kahungunu 
usufruct" rights over Te W/w/1ganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary is to treat the resources as 
privately owned (see Chapter Eight for an alternative). The concern appears to be that if 
Ngiiti Klihu/1gUI111 'own' the common resources then they will apply the Western concepts 
of private property rights to what have been llsed and abused, by Europeans, as common 
resources since the IHSOs (Wai 55). 
Ngclti Kahul1gullu had allowed the first settlers to take kai moana from the estuary, but they 
had not expected this to lead to loss of control over their t(longa. In the words of a 
kaumlitull 
the oll'er to share a meal is not a license to eat the whole feast 
(Wai 55). 
4 Usufruct is a Western legal term to try and describe Maori customary rights to lise a resource that is 
not the same as ownership (private property) of the rcsoun':L' (M<llugh. 1994), 
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6.2 A Ngiiti Kahungunu View of Common Resources 
Ngiiti Kalwngunu use of taongalnatural resources is based on the understanding that they 
are part of the natural world, and that Ngati Kalumgul1l1 do not own, as property, any part 
of the natural world. Their role is to 'wisely manage', as guardians, the taonga/naturai 
resources that they use. Ng(lti Kahllngunu also understood that they had usufruct rights to 
wOl1ga/natural resources not personal and private ownership. This meant that personal 
'ownership's of taonga/natural resources was not part of the Ngliti Kahungul1u way of 
managing common resources.(' 
Taonga/natural resources are seen as gifts from Atua. The Atua gave the people gifts of 
mana, wairua, tikanga and reo to assist them as kailiaki. These gifts gave Ngc7ti 
Kahungunu: the power to be the representative guardians of the tuol1ga/natural resources, 
a spiritual link with their taonga/natural resources, plus the values and beliefs and language 
to aid them in their role as kaitiaki (HBRe Regional Policy Statement). Therefore Ngc7ti 
Kahungullu, like all iwi, would never have given away their mana7 over the land 
(Sorrenson, 1989; Binney, 1990). The tem1 'tangata .vhenua' refers to the relationship 
between the people and the land, and recognises that people belong to particular places. 
Mana whenua is the power associated with the possession of land and its productive 
capacity to sustain the iwi/hopn. 
Mal/a whenI/o thus d(ff'ereci great(v.li·om the idea of "ownership" in the 
Europeun sense. Even when this notion was introduced with colonisation 
it remained alien to Maori (sic) people (Wai 38: 13). 
The Muriwhenua Fisheries Report said that 
IT! he division (){properties was less Importallt to Miiori t/1al1 the rules that 
governed their lise.... fond) a distinctive economic ethic of reciprocity 
(Waitangi Tribunal, 1988: 179). 
In part, the mana of hapaliwi is linked to their ability to develop and maintain relationships 
on the basis of their tuol1gu/natural resources. It is due to this relationship that the 
treatment of taol1ga/natural resources is important (Dick, 1992). One reason for communal 
Not so much ownership or possession as the right to usc and control which I will explain lutter. 
(, Scc Asher and NuulIs ( 19X7) and Patterson ( 19(2) for further discussion or Miiori lund tcnurc. 
Mana is a combination of both genealogy and performance. Having the right wJrakapapa is no 
guaruntec of lilli/iii. The primary clements of mal1l1 (afua, III/JIIIW, and It'Jrellua) ure counterbalanced by 
(in)action as judg.ed by the i\l'II/WllIi (Kawiluru, 19HX: Barlow, 1994: pel's. ('(Jill .. 1'omoal1u, 19(,)4). 
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ownership of taonga/natural resources is that hapu/iwi identity and status is affected by the 
physical condition of their taonga/natural resources. Another reason that iwi/hapi7 protected 
the natural resources was so that they could be judiciously traded to benefit the hapu 
(Parsons, 1994). 
Alan. This trade was not done at the expense of leaving th(! 
resource in such a depleted state that it would not support 
the tangata vl'henlla. The resources are selected fhr (/ 
spec(/ic use. For example a hapLi needing a tohunga and 
going to another hapu with a koha made up (?/a selection (~/ 
their natuml resources as payment for the services (~/ the 
tohunga. 
Another informant also described how /wpii from around Te W/wllganlli-a-Orotu/Ahuriri 
Estuary would trade fish etc., with inland iwi, for produce from the forest. 
Sean. They [Ngati Kahungunu) would exchange their shellfish with 
other tri/J(!s that had access to difFerent Foods, like hirds. 
" . 
This would give them food during when they didn't harvest 
the/ish. 
Such trade was part or common resources being in collective ownership. To deplete the 
resources by unsustainable use would result in the loss of mana. The people would suffer 
if they did not have the ability to sustain themselves or reciprocate gifts with other 
iwi/hapfi. For the above reasons, Ngati Kahungllnu did not traditionally let common 
property pass into individual ownership. One informant stated that natural resources are 
for the collective sustenance of people. 
Fred. What is the land there lor? For the sustenance ~/ th(! 
people. 
In regard to tribal fishing zones within Te Whanganui-a-Orotu/Ahuriri Estuary, there was 
a distinction between those areas directly associated with each hap17 and other areas that 
where for communal use. 
Most ... gathered food in areas where their ancestral tribal lands 
hordered Te W/wnganui-a-Orotu. There were however communal 
zones 'where various hapz'l with ancestral and occupational rights all 
gath(!red/oodfi'ccly. One such area was near the present Iron Pot 
and Inner Har/Jollr (Hiha, 1992: 14). 
Thus the hap17 around Te Whanganui-a-Orotll/Ahuriri Estuary had zoned the area in 
establishing collective resource sharing arrangements. This would have allowed for the 
exclusion of people who did not have ancestral and occupation rights, and had not 
participated in the maintenance and care of Te Whanganlli-a-Orotu/Ahuriri Estuary. 
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6.3 Defining Common Resources 
The preceding discussion shows a significant difference in the way that Western and Maori 
cultures allocate and manage common resources. The difference reflects the cultural 
paradigm and the different meanings attached to taonga/natural resources. To help 
understand the implications of this difference, it is necessary to have a operative definition 
of common resources. 
Property, by definition, is a concept that arises out of (the concept of) ownership. Through 
ownership people have the right to use their property and to exclude others from using it. 
This concept of property fits the regime of private property rights .. The counterpart to 
private property is common property. Common property includes those resources which 
are perceived to be in common ownership for the use and benefit of all members of a 
conUl1unity or state. Berkes (1989) states that common property resources have two 
essential problems. First, the inability to control people's access (exclusion) to the 
resource; second, a 'free rider' problem in that each L1ser can subtract from the welfare of 
other users. These problems with common resources lead to defining common property 
resources as: a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves 
subtraction from others (Ostrom, 1986; Fortmann and Bruce, 1988). 
There have been two Western responses to resolve the 'access' and 'free rider' problems 
associated with common resources (Hide, 1987, 1988; Berkes, 1989). One response is to 
make the resource commercial (private property) and access to it contestable, such as the 
quota system for commercial fishing (Rennie, 1993). The second response is to establish 
the state's private property right over the resource. The state retains all ownership and 
regulatory control over people's access to and use of the resources, whereas traditional 
indigenous communities have rituals and rules. 
The indigenous communities' alternative to resolve the problems of 'uncontrolled access' 
and' free riders' was to establish communal property regimes. Communal property regimes 
enable fulfilment of the following functions which benefit the community. The primary 
function amongst community members is to avoid confl ict over resources. The 
minimisation of resource-use conflicts helps to secure a livelihood for all community 
members by co-operative participation in meeting basic needs. The protection of 
livelihoods is a function of a communal property regimes because it creates some security 
and certainty. Communal resource regimes provide rules and rituals for resource use and 
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access as well as the conservation and protection of the resources (Tisdell, 1990). These 
mitigate against individual gain and the personal accumulation of surplus, and conversely, 
against wasting resources. Traditional communal property regimes often functioned in such 
a way that a more ecologically sustainable use of resources resulted compared to Westem 
regimes (Berkes, 1989). 
Open access 
State property 
Communal property 
Free-for-all; resource-use rights are neither exclusive 
nor transferable, these rights are owned in common 
with open-access for everyone (property to no one). 
Ownership and management control is held by the 
nation state or crown; including resources to which 
use and access rights may(not) be specified. 
Use-rights for the resource are controlled by an 
identifiable group. Resources are not privately owned 
nor managed by the state. The community decides 
who, and how the resource should be used. The 
resources are common property to the community 
only and outsiders are excluded. 
Figure 5 Idealized types of property rights regimes relevant to common 
resources (from Berkes, 1989: 1 0). 
Common property is either considered as free for all (Open Access), or owned by the state 
(Slate Property) (Figure 5). The Crown controls resource use through regulation. 
Individuals or companies may negotiate with the state for concessions (property rights) to 
lise common resources, thereby gain use or control of particular taonga/natural resources 
(Figure 5). This is particularly so with the coastal zone, which is substantially un-allocated 
Crown-owned lund (Rennie, 1993). Coastal water is defined as a common resource (State 
owned and managed), a free good that belongs to everyone, so access is open and freely 
available to all citizens. This explains why there was no apparent conflict, initially, with 
Ngiifi Kahlll1g1l1711 continued customary lise and existing fishing rights, so long as the 
settlers could fish also. Today the Crown controls the use of the remnant open space of 
Te WI7((l1g(mui~{f-OrottiIAhuri"i Estuary for the benefit of 'all New Zealanders' but the 
remainder is in private ownership. Common resources, in this case, are the resources that 
remained after the use of market mechanisms to allocate private property rights to the land 
surrollnding the lagoon. 
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6.4 Managing Common Resources and Cultural Paradigms 
Cultural paradigms are also expressed in the systems of taonga/naturaI resource access and 
allocation (Rennie, 1993). Grima and Berkes (1989:37) point out that 
[Clultural relativity operates not 011(\1 with the definition of 
resources, but a/so what constitutes a workahle arrangement/or the 
slIstainahle managemenl 0/ resources. 
As the case of NgcJti Kahungunu and Te Whanganui-a-Orotu/Ahlll'iri Estuary has shown, 
Western resource management tends to utilise state regulation and market mechanisms 
(individual and private property rights) as the 'workable an'angements' for managing 
common resources, rather than a local collective communal property regime. Therefore 
there is an inherent difference between the SWP and the Ngati Kahul1gul1l1 systems for 
managing taonga/natural resources. The factors of resource ownership and resource access 
affect how common resources are managed. The relationship between resource ownership 
and resource access is presented in Figure 6. 
A 
Open Access 
C 
Public Ownership [Crown] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Private Ownership 
B 
Closed Access 
D 
Figure 6 Property ownership and access (adapted from Berkes, 1989). 
Access to an area can be limited (closed access) to a few tlauthorised" personnel, for 
example, parts of the Napier Airport. These areas can provide a significant open space 
zones. Private ownership tends to close off access (Figure 6, point 'D'). Unlimited access, 
for example, would be the Pandora Pond area of Te Wlwnganlli-a-OI'OIU/Ahul'iri Estuary 
for recreational lise (Figure 6, point' A'). Some resource lIses could be restricted even 
though the resource is owned by the Crown (Figure 6, point 'B'), ror example, prohibiting 
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power boats from the Pandora Pond area. This is necessary to protect the resource and 
minimise resource use conflicts. There are multiple ways in which the permutations 
between resource use and resource ownership can be arranged to minimise con11icts. This 
is only possible if resource ownership is treated as separate from resource access and use. 
(This is explored further in Chapter Seven.) 
A common assumption is that much of AOlearoalNew Zealand's conservation estate and 
coastal zone, and the laol1ga/natural resources contained in them, are considered common 
property (Rennie, 1993). Therefore, groups like Public Access New Zealand (PANZ) base 
their rights to use these resources on an 'open access' and 'public ownership' view of 
common property. There is the expectation that the Crown's common property is 
administered to provide open access for all New Zealanders for the common good (point 
. A' in Figure 6). This is the closest scenario that might emulate Hardin's (1968) 'Tragedy 
of the Commons'. The tragedy of exploitation is due to a potential lack of control of 
resource extraction because there is no ownership of the resource (Grima and Berkes, 
1989). The case of Hardin's 'commons' appears to be hypothetical, because the use of 
common resources is often regulated by the State or a local community. Common 
taol1galnatural resources can be managed under a number of different property rights 
regimes (Ostrom, 1986). In the words of one infom1ant, although he did not articulate it 
as such, there was a link between resource ownership, property rights and sovereignty. 
Ray. II's hard, il1 my mind, 10 separate property ./i'OI71 ownership I 
suppose. Um ... with the ownership oj'that lalld comes some sort q{ 
right (?f' use. And yet that in itse(j'is governed hy a set (?j'rules that 
are valuc packed. Hrnv that relates perhaps to {f Milori perspective 
q( sovel'eign~1' I'm 1101 :·il/re. 
The fundamental difference between the administrators of the RMA and Ngilti Kahungunu 
is that 
In many Westel'l1 societies, the individual se(l-il1terest is supreme. 
In many other societies ... the individual is not the dominant locus 
qlclwice; the community is the relevant decisiOlH1wking unit (Grima 
& Berkes, 1989:37). 
The common resource regimes highlight the contrast between the collective communal 
locus of tikal/go Mc/ori and the individualism, and protit motive, inherent in the SWP, 
... [which} created [a} tension hetween community-level resource-use 
rules and state-level rules, and between communal-level interests and 
economic development interests (Baines, 1989; cited in Berkes, 
1989: 12). 
Therefore 
Much resource management thinking - for example the 'tragedy of the 
commons' model (Hardin, 1968) - is Western ethnocentric, emphasizing 
competition rather then cooperation and assuming the supremacy of 
individualism rather than coml1lunitarianism .... [this} model over emphasises 
the solutions of privatization and central administrative controls at the 
expense of local-level controls and se(fmanagement (Berkes, 1989:2). 
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Herein lies the need to consider a community-based approach to the management of 
taonga/natural resources. The incorporation of tikanga Maori as an alternative to current 
'workable arrangements' for resource management needs to be explored (see Chapter 
Eight). Ngati Kahungunu traditionally operated a communal property regime (similar to 
that in Figure 5) based on a collective societal structure (Binney, 1990). As a collective 
society wi th a cuI ture 0 l'intra-triba I cooperation rather than competi tion, common resources 
are not privately owned. Rather the sense of "ownership" is one of having a relationship 
with the resource and a responsibility to ensure that the resource's integrity is sustained 
(Baines, cited in Berkes, 1989). Such resource "ownership" is characterised by the group's 
usufruct rights, not exclusive personal use rights. A communal resource regime enabled 
Ngc7ti Kahungllnu to fultil the multiple functions required of common resources, while 
avoiding the problems of common property regimes. 
6.5 Common Resource Regimes and the Resource Management Act 
Resource management in Aoteal'Oa/New Zealand does not occur within the context of 
communal property regimes but is embedded in a common property regime that is often 
state controlled. One intent of the RMA is to enable LAs to facilitate a community 
approach to taonga/natural resource management (Rennie, 1993). This is evident in the 
RMA requirements for sufficient consultation in regard to regional plans. The process is 
an attempt to define clear rights to use a particular resource through the instruments of 
plans and resource consents. The RMA does not address the issue of resource ownership 
beyond considering resource consents to be non-transf'erable private property rights that are 
attached to resource usc rights (RMA Section 122 (2)(c); and Sections /34- /37) for a 
maximum period or 35 years (RMA Section /23). This reflects a Western view of 
individual private property rights, within a Western economic system. The RMA is used 
to mediate between private property rights and the effects of using a resource on 'third 
parties' who are an important ractor in resource management. At present, Maori interests 
appear to be given little more weight than those of other 'third parties'. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Piikehii respondents tended to support an approach to common resource property rights that 
was more reliant on state control. This was on the basis that common resources were for 
the common good of all citizens. Likewise they down-played the second article of the 
Treaty in regard to Ngiifi Kahungul1u use of natural resources. Ngiiti Kahungunu argue that 
their rights to resource use and management have been negated. Ngati Kahungunu have 
a communal arrangement for common resource property rights. They base this on their 
cosmology that relates them to the resource and the spiritual importance of maintaining the 
quality of the resource. This ensures their survival and increases mana. Therefore, the 
primary assumptions made in Western and traditional views about what constitutes cOlllmon 
property and the institutional arrangements for its management are in conflict. 
It appears that the RMA allows a community approach to faonga/natural resource 
management. The question of resource ownership, or for Ngafi Kahungul1u the issues of 
priority of right to manage a resource, have not been settled. For Ngati KahungllJ1l1 both 
resource ownership and priority of use are guaranteed in Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi (Article II). 
Property rights, within the framework of the SWP, potentially exclude any collective and 
cooperative community structures for the management of laonga/natural resources. 
Western private property rights therefore do not accommodate likanga Milo!'i nor allow for 
Ngilti Ka/1Lmgllll1l systems of care for taonga/naturai resources. In Aoteal'Ou/New Zealand, 
common resources are often defined as being publicly owned with open access for aIL 
Unrestrained open access is illusionary. The Crown, by regulation, controls access to 
common resources. In Chapter Seven, I consider who has the 'priority-of-right' to use the 
'common resources' of AlllIriri Estuary. Priority-of-right to use taonga/natural resources 
is defined by the chosen property-rights regime and who has ownership of the resource. 
In the case of Ngiiti Ka/llIl1gllllll and Te Whunganui-a-Orotu/Ahuriri Estuary the issue of 
resource ownership and management is an integral part of settling the issue of sovereignty. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Treaty Limits on Crown Sovereignty 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that the Crown does not have the exclusive and exhaustive right to 
control the use of all taongalnatural resources. I contend that Crown sovereignty is limited 
by the Treaty that guaranteed Ngali Kahungul1l1 the right to 'undisturbed possession' of 
their lool1ga/natural resources. I will first present the Ngali Kahul1gul1l1 case for ownership 
of their taonga/natural resources and then the responses of the LA and environmental group 
respondents. Ngdli Kal1llngu1111 sovereignty, through restored resource use, will give them 
control over their customary resources and it will limit Crown sovereignty. 
Sovereignty can vary in its scope and type (MCHugh, 1989; Sharp, 1991). Sovereignty is 
the authority to regulate people and their activities within a specific territory. The 
ownership and control of common resource use is mediated by processes of 'human 
territoriality' (Sack, 1986; Agnew and Duncan, 1989). Sites (1973:2 1) notion that, 'control 
is the basis of social order', also helps explain the Crown's control of common resources. 
7.1 Ngiiti Kahungunu Loss of TaongalResources 
Maori land and resource alienation often occurred through legal processes (Orange, 1987; 
Kelsey, 1990). Binney (1990) provides the following insights into how Ngc71i Kahungu1711 
lost land and resources through the decisions of the Native Land Court. Binney describes 
the Heretaunga land transaction as notorious and illegal at the time. Parcels of Maori land 
greater than 5,000 acres, by law, were to stay in Maori tribal ownership - the Heretaunga 
block, in Hawke's Bay, was 19,000 acres (pel's. com., Tomoana, 1994). Instead, in 1867, 
this land went to ten chiefs, as trustee-owners, representing sixteen hapt7. These chiefs sold 
mllch of the land to repay debts, including costs incurred whilst fighting for the Crown 
against Te Kooti. Through such 'land law', Ngali Kahungunu were trapped into a Western 
system of individualised resource ownership that was hostile to their communal system of 
managing common resources. The Crown's manipulation of the judicial system also 
divested Ngiiti Kahungullu of Te Whal1gol1ui-a-Om/uIAhuriri Estuary taanga, contravening 
Te Tirili () Waifangi Arlicle Two. The lack of conquest by any other tribes (Parsons, 1994; 
1 See the texts cited fbr a fuller discussion of the theories of 'control' and 'human tcrritoriulity'. 
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Hiha, 1994; Waaka, 1994) and the advantages of shelter, defensibility, good habitation and 
a ready food source, indicate that the Estuary was very important to Ngati Kahunglll1l1. 
Ngiiti Kahunglll111 do not consider Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary as part of the 
deed of sale of land to MCLean in 1851 (Waf 55). The settlers had used the 
Native Land COlll't to give individual title to some Maori, so as to detach 
them pam 'tribal or national interest' and to al/oH' those individuals to 
(fI'Clii themselves to competitive prices. They "volild then dispose (?i'their 
'surpllls lal1ds' to the settlers. Then, as now, the market economy worked 
against Maori interests (Binney. 1990: 144). 
There has been a long history of a Ngiiti Kahungunu response to the loss of their 
guaranteed ownership of Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary (Binney, 1990; Parsons, 
1994). Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary was seen, by the settlers, as un-allocated 
land that the Crown owned.2 Much of the bed of the lagoon (Appendix One) is reclaimed 
land. Land reclamations stalied in the 1850s. The 1931 earthquake provided the Napier 
Harbour Board with surplus land to lease to the Napier Borough Council for urban 
expansion in the 1930s and 40s. Through land reclamation, the earthquake, the application 
of British common law, and ignoring Ngati Kahungul1u petitions to Parliament (Morgan and 
Falloon, 1993) and court claims of ownership, the resources of Te Wlwnganui-a-
OrotulAhuriri Estuary were now firmly in the hands ofthe European community (Wai 55), 
The history of Te Wlwl1ganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary shows that European commercial 
interests were firmly established through free market mechanisms, having alienated Ngiiti 
Kahungul1u from their communal-economic base. All of the development around, and 
modification to, the estuary was done without Ngllti Kahul1gul1l1 consent (Parsons, 1994). 
The loss of Te Jt'/uIIIgal1l1i-a-OrotliIAhuriri Estuary resources has meant the diminishing 
or mana due to a reduced ability to reciprocate in the exchange of goods with other iwi. 
The earthquake in 1931, which meant the advantages of more land for the LAs, was an 
indescribable loss to Nglil; Kahungunu. The remains of their spiritual, social and economic 
base was desecrated by pollution from industrial discharges, raw sewage, meat works and 
hospital efi1uent. The exclusion of Ng17ti Kahlll1glll1lf from the commercial benefits, which 
others have gained (Hiha, 1992) fi'om the use of the Estuary, has exacerbated their loss. 
The lagoon was alienated from NK(W Kalwl1KIII1U and divided up between the public authorities as 
follows: Hawke's Buy AirpOli Authority: Napier Harbour Board now the commercial Port of Napicr Ltd.: 
Dernrtmcnt of Lands and Survey was divided, ufter corrorutisation in 19!57, and now trades Us Lundcorr 
Farming Ltd. and the balu1ll:c is part of the Dcralill1ent of Conservation (DoC) estate (WlIi 55): the 
Huwke's Bay Regional Council and Narier City Council have shares in the Port of Nurier Company Ltd 
and so own land that was owned by the defunct l'Jarier Harbour Board. 
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Ngiiti Ka/lIIl1glll1l1 loss of resource ownership meant that the LAs and companies have been 
able to make substantial financial gains through selling and leasing property. M'"Lean saw 
the 'danger' of Ngtiti Kallllngllnu leasing the land to settlers because they would soon 
appreciate the new economic value of the land and not sell it, hi~dering 'settler progress 
(Wai 55). Ngati Kalnll1gunu respondents spoke about the loss of ownership and lack of 
control of their own resources, and how LAs had assumed the right to manage the resource 
for everybody - for the common good. The Crown's control of their resources was seen 
as a unilateral decision 
Harry • the crown gives the role a/control o.j'property rights to itse(f: 
Another infol111ant was more specific about the conflict over resource ownership 
Fred. 
Alan. 
... [Ngati Kahllngul111] as the mana whel1l/a .... the rights o( 
ownership. It '.'I' one o.l the major cOI!flicls.... We're fangafll 
whenlla and now the government ... Conservation Department 
and mayhe even historic societies.... then we heal' the 
Regional COl/neil is in charge o.lthat place. 
The resource management legislation excludes liS [Ngc/ti 
Kalwngllllu] ji'om any commercial aspects o.l OYI'J1ing the 
Estllarv. 
The estuary remnant is currently managed as a common resource for its recreational and 
conservation values. The existing developments and land reclamations continue to provide 
an economic return for their owners who have an economic base built on resources which 
Ngc7ti Kahllnglll1u did not sell. Even if the remnant of the estuary is returned to Ngtiti 
Kalllll1gullu ownership it is unlikely that they will be able to derive a significant economic 
base from it. The estuary is seen as a 'common resource' and there will be political 
pressure to retain the existing uses which may conflict with Ngclfi Kahlll1gunu aspirations, 
or hinder the tribe from developing its own economic base. Adam made a link between 
tbe treatment of the estuary and tangota w/Jenuo. 
Adam. HOi{J I1/any institutions have actual(v taken a deep breath and 
said, 'look we haven't done a particular(v goodjoh ourselves 
in this particular land\'cape, why don't we let the tangata 
whenua have a go at managing it, ('ven il1 partnership with 
ourselves, let them he the chail'lJerso17 for a while '. I don't 
think we could do much worse when YOIl look at Te Wluwga, 
and that 's pl'Ohah~v [heing] patl'Onisil1g.... It I'eal(v is 
appalling the way we '1'e treated it I A hl/riri Estlla/:l'! alld the 
way \l'e'l'e treated Ihe tal/gata 'rvhel1lw ... no wonder tangata 
when/lo lalk aboul them being one with the landscape. I 
mean the t\1l0 are interchangeahle, ahuse one YOLI 've alnt.~ed 
the other. 
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7.2 Responses to Miiori Resource Control 
The issue of limiting the Crown's role in resource controP, as a way for ilVi to exercise 
rangatiratanga, was a complex one for infonnants to address. There was no one clear 
answer. A number of LA staff explicitly said that they were expressing personal views in 
regard to the issue of sovereignty and resource control. For example 
Mike. 1 think they '1/ [Councils} consider it [giving control to i\\'i/ 
hut not for Vel)1 long. ThaI's jllSI 111.1' personal view. I meall 
iwi ceded kawangatanga 10 Ihe Crown and so Ihey recognise 
the right (?l Ihe Crown 10 make laws. And in retllm Ihe 
Crowl1 reserved LInder them rangatiratanga over their 
loanga. The Crown, through its kiiwangalanga role, passed 
lall's Ihat slripped rangaliralanga ./"0111 Ihe iwi ami assigned 
il to ils own statutOlY agencies. And that '.'I where Ihe 
prohlel71 lies. Eilher pass the ownership of the resources 
hac/( or pass the regulalory functions back [to ilvij. 
The infomlant gave the two options of retuming resources or regulatory functions to iwi 
as a way to reinstate rangaliratanga. The Crown argues that as sovereign, it holds both 
ownership and regulatory interests, Maori do not (Woods and Gordon, 1994). A number 
of informants also spoke of the Crown as having absolute ownership. 
Mike. Now ill relation to Treaty of Waitang; claims our positio/1 is 
that those resources are Crown owned till slich time that 
government deems other'rvise ... through stalute. 
Some LAs were starting to explore ways of involving tangala whenua in resource 
management, although the issue of who owns the resources is non-negotiable. 
Doug. One (?f'the hig challenges/or the Department [DoC) is to tl:l
' 
and to hecome mOl'e hicultural. To ,"vorl< towards establishing 
li'hat the iwi conservation ethic is. 
Doug explained that bi-culturalism creates tensions for DoC because the department is 
caught between Treaty obligations and the values expressed by pakeha conservationists. 
Doug. [Some] within iwi would argue that the Piikehii value .\:Fstem 
is taking precedence. Historical(v that may have some 
truth ... [hut in} Pakelu7 conservation groups you may well 
hear the opinion voiced that this department is giving undue 
Iveight to Miiori value ,,:vstems in regard to conservation. So 
that's a tightrope we are walking ... to maintain credihility 
olld/aith with tCingala whenua ... [and} Pc1kelul community. 
Settlers uistrusted any form of 'Mc/ori authority over their own lanu' (Binney. 1990: 1(2). 
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Conservationists are concerned about environmental degradation, and public access (Wood 
and Gordon, 1994), should Maori get control of common resources. Continued public 
access was seen as essential and therefore the Crown needed to retain control. There was 
a SUspICIon that claims for kaitiaki maybe a cover for commercial exploitation of the 
resource. 
Jane 1/1 I don't want to see natural areas, like alit national parks, 
handed over. They [Maori} will say they HJ(mt kaitiakL. 
They should he administered by the Crown for the henefit of 
evel:vone ... hecause they have al1 intrinsic value .... J don't 
wa11l to see someone saying at the gate way )!()u've got to 
pay so mllch before you can even come in. ' 
Progress has been made in some LAs in recognising that Ngiiti Kahungunll may want to 
do things differently than is permitted under CUITent planning rules. 
Ray 1/1 In our district plan [HDC) we have controlsfor 'vvhat we call 'marae 
localities' to provide certain rights and uses within those zones. But 
[HDC} put .fair~v onerous demands 0/1 that communi(v to reach the 
threshold where we suddenly give them the power... this is early 
polh:v development, II:vil1g to start the hands-qU' approach that 
recognises sovereignty through either ol-vnership or c/assUication [of 
land} under Ihe Maori Land COllrls... Maori land IIndel' Ihis 
particlilar lenure stays with the hapa ... we will try and recognise 
some of Ihe cull ural aspirations/or that land by taking some ~lour 
planning controls ~fr it. 
The right to express rangaliratal1ga is therefore granted by the LA, but hopii must prove 
they are responsible before they are given any planning concessions, This seems to be a 
rather paternalistic approach where the power is held by the LA, which sets the conditions 
that have to be met. There is also the problem of LAs having to deal with the public, and 
councillors, who might not be fully familiar with Treaty issues. In response to the 
suggestion of an iwi management plan, a spokesperson for an environmental group said that 
Jane 1/1 II would on(v he a wish list, wouldn'l iI, While there's all 
Ihese hodies [LAs] involved. We would like to see it 
declared an estuarine park, and one aUlhority managing il .... 
We thoughl perhaps 'when the Department ql Conservation 
was set up Ihat it would be one auth()ri~v ... it hasl1 't resolved 
anything I'ea/~\.... to see Ihat il remains an open space 
accessihle 10 evel:VOl1e. 
The public perception of the Treaty, complexity of local government and Pakeha 
consel'vation interests, all work to maintain existing political barriers to any exercise of 
Ngc1/i Ka/llIl1gllllll sovereignty, or control over Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhllrirf Estuary, 
Ray. 
Mike. 
No matter whether you like the Treaty or not, we are partners, we 
do have those ohligations.... I don', know (j' it [the Treaty) is 
accepted by them [the public} .... there is a grudging recognition that 
they have 10. But they don " welcome il with open arms. 
You'd have sOl11e residual reluctance at a political level to 
tran.yj'er decision-making fa iwi. Not onzv in this cOl/ncil. it's 
just not the way they think. 
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The way councils 'think' (SWP) is linked to how they might perceive sovereignty and the 
Government's right to rule. If sovereignty is absolute and exclusive then there is no 
potential for partnership between Ngiiti Kahungul1u and the Crown. 
7.3 Types of Sovereignty 
Five different types of sovereignty (Awatere, 1984; McHugh, 1989; Sharp, 1991) have been 
identified, namely: absolute sovereignty in which the subjects have ceded everything to the 
ruler (see Hobbes, 1651, Leviathan); ecclesiastical sovereignty, through the separation of 
church and state; political/civil sovereignty where the state has the public's mandate to act; 
legal sovereignty which is the a-political autonomy of the justice system; and finally, dual 
sovereignty where power is shared, or some authority is ceded to another group that is not 
the state. Dual sovereignty may be self-rule, self-management, self-government, or a 
partnership (Chapter Eight). 
The British Crown initially treated Melon' as sovereign (Kingsbury, 1989) for at least four 
reasons. First, Me/ori had their own laws and customs. Second, aboriginal rights were 
recognised, initially. Third, there was the recognition that contractual theory would apply. 
Fourth, voluntary consenL was needed in the making of treaties (McHugh, 1989), meaning 
that the Crown would have no sovereignty over tribes that did not sign the Treaty or if the 
signatories had an 'imperfect knowledge of its consequences' (Swainson\ cited in 
McHugh, 1989:41), McHugh (1989:33, citing Dicey, 1885) distinguishes between legal 
sovereignty and political sovereignty. 
Legal sovereign(v is the constitutional authority vested in the Crown in its 
executive, legislative {lncljudicial capacities. Political sovereignty however 
descrihes the relationship between Crown and suhject. 
Political sovereignty is related to the will of the people and requires public consent to 
provide the Crown with a mandate to govern (representative democracy). This controls and 
~ William Swuinsoll was the first Attorney-General or New Zealand. 
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limits the power of goveI11lllenL In contrast, the judicial system (legal soYereignty) knows 
nothing of the will of the people (Dicey, 1885 cited in McHugh, 1989). The relationship 
between legal and political sovereignty is defined as legitimacy (ihid.). 
Rangaliralanga is a cal1 to share the Crown's political sovereignty with longala whenu(I, 
but present constitutional structures make such arrangements almost impossible (McHugh, 
1989: Sharp, 1991; Kerins, 1992). This has given Te Tirili 0 WailClngi, and aboriginal 
rights), no legal relevance or enforceability under the law and makes them a matter of 
politics (Hackshaw, 1989). Yet Sorrenson (1989), pointing to Waitangi Tribunal 
conclusions, states that future legislation and policy will be appraised by the spirit of Te 
Tirili 0 Waitangi. Sovereignty is not as clear cut as the Crown's case for absolute 
authority. 
Maori chiefly authority has long been seen as a threat to Crown sovereignty and Piikehii 
progress (Binney, 1990). There is an aversion to Maori communal land tenure because it 
hindered land purchase and subverted individual rights and private property rights (ibid.). 
Miiori sovereignty (mana Milori moIl/hake) is the 
l'estomliol1 and relentioll (~r Iribal resources under Irihal conlrol where 
Maori CIIStOI1WI)' law is Ihe governing code (McHugh, 1989:25). 
The Crown needs to recognise the doctrine of aboriginal rights and the independent control 
over parlicular areas (territory) because 
a society was sovereign where it governed Use(/' hy ils own laws and 
([ulhorily (McHugh, 1989:28). 
This is a constitutionalist's view of sovereignty (Vattel, J 758, cited in McHugh, 1989), in 
which there is law and the voluntary submission of subjects. Miiori society was tribal in 
its political organisation, and it functioned with customary laws, l'al1galiraICll1ga. Thus rwi 
can be considered as sovereign. While the concept of tino ral1gatiratanga is often equated 
with Mclori sovereignty it does not appear to be considered as politically feasible by many 
Pcikel1({ (Cassidy, 1992). The government's current view of sovereignty as exhaustive, 
exclusive and indivisible, extinguishes any indigenous political or legal sovereignty. The 
government argues that Ngiili Kahullgunu are limited to only having 'use interests' and 
'value interests' In Te Whal1gal1ui~a~O/'OluIAhuriri Estuary and neither 'regulatory interests' 
~ The term 'aboriginal' denotes a claim to the original occupution and usc of a territory (Hackshaw, 
1994: 117) 
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nor 'ownership interests' (Office of Treaty Settlements/' 1994) (see Chapter Eight). The 
Crown's sovereignty is maintained by the use of territoriality. 
7.4 The Control of Common Resources Through Territoriality 
Sites (1973) argues that through socialization, individuals internalise the group's values as 
part of their identities. A collective identity gives the group sufficient cohesion to interact 
with other groups in society. Possible strategies to control other groups are challenges, 
cooperation, alliances, assimilation or the elimination of the opposition. The chosen control 
strategy depends upon the group's size, resources, power and perception of threat relaLive 
to the group that they it wishes influence. Groups, when dealing with each other, have to 
consider if, when and how they will respond. Intergroup relationships seldom reach open 
conflict, but a group may not accept the legitimacy of the regulations that constrain it 
(ihid. ). 
Sack's (19H6) theory of human territoriality attempts to integrate the concepts of 
sovereignty, property and jurisdiction into a synergistic whole. He rejected the animal 
behaviourist approach, which described human territoriality as an instinct. Sack (1986) 
referred to territoriality as a basis of power in institutional arrangements. Governments can 
utilise a variety of legal and political control strategies to maintain sovereignty over their 
telTitories. Thus, government agencies are able to control various non-government groups 
and minimise their control over common resource tenitory. Common resources are often 
contained within public territories over which variolls government agencies have legal 
jurisdiction. The control of common resource lise and access can be explained by the 
theory of human territoriality. 
The lise of territoriality depends on at least two factors: namely, who is influencing and 
controlling whom and the geographical context of space, place and time. Territoriality is 
intimately related to how people use the land, how they organise themselves in space and 
how they give meaning to place (Ibid.). Territoriality is defined as 
the alfempt hy all individual or a group 10 a.fTeet, iI?/lu(!J1ce, or cOl1trol 
people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control 
ov(!r a geographic area .... {Therefore the cOllstruction ({j'territories) takes 
an (lct of'lVill alUl involves multiple levels (?/,reasons and meanings .... [with) 
l1ornwtiv(! implicatiolls .... Territoriality points to thefact that human spatial 
t, This document is alien called the 'Fiscal Envelope'. 
relationships are not neutral.... [they} are the results of il?fluence and 
power ... il1 order to afFect, iI?jluence and control the ideas and actions (?l 
others and their access to resources (Sack, 1986: 19,26). 
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Any place becomes a territory when its boundaries are delimited and constant effort IS 
required to maintain control over access to the area. This affects and moulds people's 
behaviour and their relationship to the area. Therefore, human territoriality includes the 
controllers and those controlled within the context of human motives and aspirations (Sack, 
1986). On the basis of human territoriality, people act to classify an area, then 
communicate the boundaries of the area and, finally. enforce their control to restrict access 
and use of the area (ihid.). Sovereignty is the right to control the people, events and 
resources within a territory. 
Sack (1986) identified the following characteristics in indigenous people's expressions of 
territoriality. Collectivist indigenous societies tend to be small with a low population 
density; they are often based on kinship ties, with mythological links to their place of 
habitation, which they were given by the gods; they have an economy based on reciprocity, 
which is intimate and there is a mutual economic dependence on others; and the technology 
of production is widely available. Much of tbis fits the traditional society of Ngati 
Kalllll1guIIll. Territoriality for Ngiiti Kahungul1u is classified in tem1S of social relationships 
- their relationship to the land, kin and gods. This prevents non-community members from 
having access to common resources. In this way, territoriality promotes the union of 
people, place and events. The hierarchy of Maori society is spiritually based. Its origin 
is in the acts of la, the atua and their tupuna (Barlow, 1994). I'l!ilhapalwhiinall are the 
basic sovereign (political and legal) units upon which Maori society functioned. The 
access to and Lise of taongalnatural resources was based on this religio-social order. 
The traditional Maori territories have been fragmented by colonisation and urbanisation 
(Barlow, 1994) which have exacerbated i1tl>illwpt7 alienation frol11 their t(lol1ga/natural 
resources. It has also meant that continued occupation of tribal areas (ahi ka) has not 
always been possible, nor have tribal resource allocation zones matched the LAs 
administrative zones. Western classification of territories is more abstract than III 
indigenolls societies. because people, events and objects can be moved in and out of 
diflerellt territories (Sack, 1986). There is little sense of long-tel111 relational continuity 
with the physical landscape of the territories. In Western societies, territorial control is 
often directly related to resource ownership; private ownership gives individuals property 
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rights and privileges of control based on commercial law rather than communal 
relationships and spiritual factors. 
Western nation-state political hierarchy is secular, with absolute legal sovereignty 
(Hackshaw. 1989; McHugh, 1989). Everything, except private property, that is contained 
within the territory is owned by the state. AotearoalNew Zealand's sovereign hierarchy 
starts with the Crown/Parliamentary executive, then Government Ministries and their 
departments, then local territorial authorities, and tinally local communities and various 
interest groups. In this political hierarchy Ngiiti Kahungunu have been relegated to the 
bottom as an 'interest' or 'lobby' group. The RMA makes explicit which LAs control 
various taonga/natural resources. Territories are delimited through statute and the use of 
plans and the regulation of activities within those territories. DoC, NCC, HBRC, Napier 
Airport Authority, Land Corporation Farming Ltd., and the Port of Napier all control zones 
within Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary. The HOC has control of the pastoral 
catchment area westward of Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary included in the Alit/riri 
Estuary Management Area (Appendix Jhree). Sack's (1986) definition of human 
territoriality, and Sites' (1973) theory of control show that the 'workable arrangements' for 
common resource regimes are not neutral. The 'workable arrangements' are the result of 
political and legal power to assert Crown ownership and control over common resources. 
7.5 The RMA and Tino Rangatiratanga 
The RMA makes no reference to rangatiratanga. This is consistent with the Crown's view 
of one sovereign (Brookfield, 1989). Wickliffe (Wai 55) as counsel for Ngiiti Kallungunu 
argued that the RMA Section Ii is too weak and does not give tangata whenua equal 
partnership. She also stated that it was most unlikely for LAs to consider using Section 33 
of the RMA. The Crown has separated the issue of sovereignty and resource ownership 
from resource allocation. This is in essence the omission of Article 11 of Te Til'fti 0 
Waftangi from the RMA which guarantees tangala whenua undisturbed possession of their 
taonga/natural resources. The implication of this omission is that the RMA's provisions 
for clIllUral ..,vell being (RMA Sect. 5) will be weakened. The weaker application of the 
cultural principles provided for in the RMA may not enable Ngiiti Kahungullu to be an 
effective partner in the management of taol1ga/natural resources. Neither will this ensure 
that Ngclti Kailllnglll1ll cultural values are accommodated in environmental planning, 
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Te Whanganlli-a-Oro/lIIAhuriri Estuary includes common resources to which the public has 
enjoyed recreational access for many years. The LAs have also used the area for farming 
and transport infrastructure, although they never consulted Ngati Kahul1gunu about any of 
the developments. I asked infornlants, 'did they see any way around the potential conflict 
between Ngati Kahunglll111 aspirations and thepublic's 'right' to use the area or resource'?'. 
The response was based on the need to consult and find a compromise. 
Henry. 
Jane. 
I think the OI1(V way you can work through those issues ... it 
comes hack /0 the process (d' consultation hOH' (~flective~l' 
parties work through the issues together and .lind 
compromises themselves. 
We 're not at all opposed to the iwi having their rights to/ish 
to take kaimoQnu,lj'om in there, not at all. Provided there is 
regulations that mean it's l10tjished out. I think you have to 
do that with any resource, otherwise there's no resource /e,l!. 
Relying 011 the consultation merry-go-round and Western concepts of appropriate use of 
common resources does not deal with the fundamental question of resource ownership. The 
consultation process and common-resource management arrangements are strategies for the 
existing owners to maintain territorial control because they exclude Ngati Kahungullu from 
direct management of their taongainaturaJ resources. This is reinforced by Ngati 
Kallllnglll1u lack of resources to challenge the status quo (Kerins, 1992). 
7.6 Conclusion 
Territoriality helps to maintain the SWP and Western common resource regimes. Here, 
too, there is little inclusion of Ngati Kahungunu social and environmental values. The use 
of territoriality is also culturally defined. Through the SWP, common resources are detined 
and managed on the basis of Western science and political structures. Ngiiti Kahungullu 
do not perceive the resources in the same way, nor do they find Western systems of 
resource management in keeping with their traditions. To overcome these barriers there 
is a genuine need for Ngc7ti Kahllngunl1 to be much more involved in the management of 
Te Whanganlli-a-Ol'otuIAhliriri Estuary. The use of a 'joint management' approach would 
be one way of ensuring their participation as equal pal1ners and the restoration of their 
territoriality over Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri Estuary. I will address this in the next 
and tinal chapter. 
Chapter Eight: 
A Bi-cultural Joint Management Approach 
to Common Resources 
8.0 Introduction 
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The argument for dual sovereignty was presented in Chapter Seven. The next step is to 
outline a possible Treaty pat1nership model which will enable Ngati Kahllngul7l1 values to 
be part of the planning process. So that Ngiiti Kahungunu likanga may be incorporated 
into decisions about the protection and use of Te Whanganui-a-OroluIAhuriri Estuary. 
8.1 The "Essential Bargain" 
The spirit of Te Tiri!i () Wai!angi relies upon a Maori understanding of the terms 
/ahwl11Gtanga (government - law and order) and lino rangatiratanga (chiefly ownership and 
use rights to laol1galnatural resources). The partnership between kiiwlIl1atanga and 
rangliliralanga is what Hughes (1988) defines as the "essential bargain". The "essential 
bargain" is the ceding of Ngiiti Kahungul1u legal sovereignty to the Crown for protection 
of their political sovereignty (McHugh, 1989). Ngati Kahungul1u, as Treaty partners, want 
shared sovereignty. The Treaty (First and Third Articles) gives the Crown the right to 
make laws that will govern all citizens, both Maort' and Piikeh(l. The Second Article 
guarantees NglI!i Ka/llIl1gul1l1 the right to be sovereign over the allocation and use of Te 
Whangal1ui-a-OrotIiIAhuriri Estuary. The Treaty Preamble is a Crown promise to protect 
Ngl7ti Kaliunglll1l1 property rights. The "essential bargain" means that the Crown's legal 
sovereignty is limited by Ngl7li KahunguJ1l1 political sovereignty. lwi would have powers 
delegated to them in recognition of their ownership of Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri 
Estuary - a limited territorial sovereignty. McHugh (1989:41) has described this 
arrangement as a 'third order of Government' in that the Crown's Treaty obligations extend 
to LAs 
The Treaty of Waifllngi is 110t relevant to central Government alone: it ... 
requires thaI there he deliherate effort towards partnership with trihes as 
nt'H' devolved structures take shape. ff' Me/or; enthusiasm for central 
Govel'l1menl 's (fhili~v to estahlish a partnership was somewhat guarded, 
there is even less cOl~/klen('e that local bodies wilt be able to act as p(/l'llIe/',\' 
with Ml7ori. resisting cal/s .fhr simple 'mqjorilism' and demands fhr 
economic progress Ihal may severe(v disadvantage local trihes (Durie, 
19R9). 
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Ngati Kahungunll aspirations for their cultural values to be accommodated in the planning 
process are hindered in the following ways. First, the Government is unwilling to discuss 
sovereignty because it holds the view that sovereignty cannot be shared; it is the owner of 
all common resources and it alone has the power to make regulations. This means that 
Ng(lti Kahungunll interest in Te Whanganui-a-Orotu/Ahllriri Estuary are limited to "use" 
and "value" interests only (Office of Treaty Settlements, 1994 1). Second, the HBRC lacks 
an effective partnership with Ngati Kahungunu (Kerins, 1992). LAs have the propensity 
to act on the basis of public majority views and economic progress which disadvantaged 
Ngclti Kahunglll1u. LAs do not regard Ngati Kahllngunu to be the owners of Te 
Whanganui-a-Orotll/Ahllriri Estuary. Third, Ngati Kahul1gul1u use rights and ancestral links 
with Tc: Whanganlli-a-Orotu/Ahuriri Estuary have been reduced to being of no more 
signiticance than the values held by other citizens. Fourth, Ngati Kahungunu responsibility 
to Te Whanganui-a-Orotu/Ahuriri Estuary as kaitiaki does not fit the planning process 
which is based on SWP models of property rights and science. These all amount to the 
lack of affirmative action needed to reestablish Ngati Kahungunll sovereignty. 
8.2 The Basis for a Crown Iwi Partnership 
The Government has a mandate and responsibility to govern; Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi makes 
this explicit. It has a dual responsibility to settle valid Treaty grievances fairly and to 
ensure that the environment is protected (Hughes, 1994). Alongside, but not subservient 
to the Crown's governance, is the tongata whenlla right to control their taonga/natural 
resources and have direct participation in decision making at regional level. One way to 
fulfil Treaty obligations and positive environmental outcomes is to accord Ngati Kahungunu 
their rightful place in the planning process, as an equal partner. Maori are not given 
priority of right to use natural resources (Wickliffe, 1994) and the RMA does not 
adequately accommodate tilwnga Maori in managing natural resources. Instead there has 
been a steady transfer of power and responsibility from iwi to the State. 
That process has heen particularly obvious in the control of land 
and other physical resources (Durie, 1989:292). 
Durie (1989) goes on to say that national priorities and the desire for homogeneity In 
society has also led to the professionals and bureaucrats eroding iwi authority. 
1 The 'Fiscal Envelore' documents identify four main tyres of interest in natural resources. The Crown 
alone has Owners/HI) and Regll/al(J/:1' interests, whereas Use and Value interest are thc limits of interest 
rlaced on iwi. Use interest is limited to srecific uses of a resource as at I X40, and that any (non Mtiori) 
existing rrorerty rights or future commercial interests will limit the claim settlements. 
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Wickliffe (1994) compared the Australian, Canadian and American processes for dealing 
with indigenous peoples' resource claims. A number of important features for any treaty 
claim settlement process were identified (Table 8.1). 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Table 8.1 
No national generic settlements 
like the fiscal envelope 
Consensus settlements 
fair to Melor; and third parties 
Representation and Self Government 
the principle of "First Nations'" rights, a constitutional basis 
for the sovereignty of indigenous peoples 
Indigenous Ownership 
of natural resources needs to be a feature of claim settlements 
Priority of use/take/access 
for indigenous peoples as a legal principle [Courts in USA, 
Canada and Australia accept this]. 
Joint Management 
after the issue of resource title and ownership are resolved [for 
example, by the Waitangi Tribunal]. 
Important features to be included in the Treaty-claim settlement 
process (Wickliffe, 1994:95). 
The features in Table 8.1 need to be part of the Aotearoa/New Zealand Treaty claim 
settlement process because they help to secure a durable and fair settlement of claims. 
Ngc7fi Kai1ulIgul1l(, as management partners with LAs, would be able to bring their expertise 
and experience to the environmental decision making process. This would ensure culturally 
appropriate public access and protection for indigenous species and habitats. This would 
help to calm environmentalists' fears of environmental degradation and loss of access. 
8.3 Local Authority Barriers to Partnership 
The main options for resource management and control when Treaty claims are settled are 
to reinstate iwi resource ownership; to compensate iwi for the loss of resources; change the 
management objective and/or use of the resource; change who manages/administers the 
resource without changing management structures or objectives to maintain the benefits for 
existing resource users (Wickliffe, 1994). Resource ownership, property rights, appear to 
have been separated from the management of the resource in regard to Maori claims. 
Mike. So we [HBRC} refuse to get involved in resource ownership 
COI?flicts ... [and} compensation issues relating to land or 
resources under claim .... 'not our deal, not our junction '. 
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Western systems of resource tenure do not nom1ally separate resource ownership and the 
right to manage the resource, except in that the state has the power to regulate the actions 
of property owners. The LAs disclaim ownership of Te Whallganui-a-OrotuIAhuriri 
Estuary but retain management control of the resources. This situation arises because LAs, 
particularly the HBRC, reject the claim that they are Crown agents. They see themselves 
as being created by statute to regulate resource use without owning the resources. The 
LAs' level of control gives them resource ownership, as agents of the Crown. Govel11l1lent 
policy does not separate resource ownership from resource regulation, it holds onto both. 
Mike. What council says is that we're not the Crown, and we're /lot 
even an agent of the Crown .... elected representatives tl1m 
Iwve heen charged with making decisions and they eXE'l'cise 
autollomy in making those decisions. So thE' on~1' H'ay WE' can 
take TrE'aty of Waitangi issues is through the provisions (?f' 
the lairS we operate under .... and Iveigh lip them and take 
them illto accollnt in policies and consents. But in terms of 
some of the 'yvider matters that are under the Trea~v itse(f: 
part two of the Treaty ... the council is struggling with that. 
Until the Government addresses the issue of sovereignty for Ngciti Kahungunu and their 
ownership rights, Ngl7li KahullguJ7u will be constrained to working within LA structures 
to manage their toonga/natural resources. The question of resource ownership lies outside 
the RMA's scope so I will only consider the option of changing the administration over the 
resource. Without changing the ownership of natural resources there are two options: one, 
management to be taken over by iwilhapl1; or two, a joint management regime between 
hvilhapO and the LAs acting as a Crown agents. This is not how LAs operate at present. 
Changes to the management of Te Whunganui-a-Orotul Ahuriri Estuary will require the LAs 
to be willing to implement RMA Section 33 which allows the LAs to transfer powers to 
other authorities, including i-vvi. LAs are most reluctant to consider a transfer of power. 
Mike. I dOli 't think such tran.~ler (~rp()wer [to ;wi] 'rvould meet the 
criteria of'section 33 qf'the RMA .... we can on~\' trany(er 
power and/itnetions to (f puhlic authority .. " if would have to 
he demonstrated that it was in the interest (?/the community 
to do that .... not ()n~1' the Mc'iori c()mmllni~v. The i'rl'i would 
haw! to ful\'I! the technical expertise to undertake that 
jill1ctioll, and it "VOl/Ill have to he more e.fliciel1f ... fdecrease) 
transaction costs for resource users .... at the end q( the day 
even if' you Irc/l1.~'fer the .limction the council remains 
respol1sihle ... we would want it to he wrapped up pret(v tight~v. 
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Mike gave many reasons for opposing the transfer of any authority to iwi based on the 
requirements of the RMA Section 33: the iwi might not be a public authority; it might limit 
wider community interests; there is a lack of technical expertise (see Chapter Five) to 
manage resources; there might be increased costs to resource users; and the HBRe does 
not want to take the risk because iwi are not legally responsible. There is no potential for 
equal partnership in such an environment. The council still retains the power, their 
pol icies, their statutory position and the resources. Yet the transfer of powers would ensure 
that the function of kaitiaki is more than a metaphysical exercise a cultural caring for the 
resource. hvilhapii would have the authority rangatiratal1ga - to exercise the second 
article of the Treaty over their taonga. Once again Ngciti Kahungul1l1 would be in control 
of their taongalnatural resources. The HBRC does what is required by law and thereby 
controls the role of Ngiiti Kahungunu in resource management. 
The reluctance to give Ngiiti Kahungunu any sphere of responsibility; the assumption that 
current actions are more than what is required by statute; the concern that they might get 
it wrong; and the games of one-up-man-ship, have no place in such a crucial issue as the 
management of natural resources when dealing with the aspirations of Ngiili Kalutl1gullu. 
Such attitudes and actions are barriers to Ngiiti Kahungul1u being seen to have a legitimate 
role in resource management. The management of the 'conservation estate' through 
Western ethnocentric common property regimes, has current priority over the development 
of a Piikeha and Maori partnership for taonga/natural resource management based on Te 
Tiriti 0 Waital1gi (Woods & Gordon, 1994). The next two quotes illustrate the reluctance 
of the HBRC and NCe to get involved beyond the minimum of their legal mandates. 
Mike. Now cOImcillors and stllff will talk about a partnership, But 
all that is, we're obliged to do that under statute. I guess the 
MClori committee, which is a discretiol7w:v thing, council 
didn'l have to do that, I guess Ihat go(;'s some way towards 
eSlahlishing a partnership. 
Another problem was that some LAs were reluctant to enter into a relationship with iwi 
Earl. There is a tendency to sit on the side lines, hecause there is a mine 
field o/'these tilings, and say '/ 'd like somebody else to come up/irsl 
and say what is sovereignly and gove/'l1orship and what these mean 
in praclice '. Hey big COpOllt .... these Maori issues, let somehody 
else take the lead CInd we can laugh at them !f they get it Yl'rDng. 
The HBRC and NCe need to change their attitudes and not ignore Ngliti Kahungullu 
aspirations, The LAs reluctance to give Ngt7ti Kahungul1u greater involvement in the 
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management of common resources could be overcome through ajoint management strategy. 
8.4 The Use of a Joint Management Strategy 
Joint management between indigenous people and Crown agents is an option for managing 
natural resources, particularly where there is public access. Joint management has been 
defined as 
[Tjhe sharing of conlrol of an area by two or more d(ff'erent groups. It 
aims to provide for ... conservation ... to maintain ... the traditional owners 
Iva/lIesl .... land} attempt[.\'j to recognise the interests oltwo cultures within 
the constraints imposed by the goal of ecosystem preservation. The model 
il1stitutionalises co-operation ill both long-term planning ... and day to· day 
loperatiol1s! (Craig, 1992). 
Joint management is a negotiated shared management of {(longa/natural resources through 
Treaty claim settlements. This would incorporate tikanga Maori because iwi management 
plans would have statutory weight. Environmental outcomes become the responsibility of 
both LAs (Crown agents) and langala whenua, a partnership of dual sovereignty. 
8.5 Comparing Examples of Joint Management 
I will outline examples~ from Australia and Canada of joint management because their 
'jurisdictions and popUlations are comparable New Zealand's' (Wickliffe. 1994:8). The 
Waimakariri District Council, DoC and Ngai Tahu will use a joint management approach 
for TlItae Patl! lagoon and the coast from Kairaki Pines north to Waikuku Beach. 
In Australia the Hawke Government (1980s) said that: Aboriginal land is inalienable and 
the land lost must be compensation for; Aboriginal sites must be protected; Aborigines 
should control mining on their land and be paid royalties. This was rejected until the Mabo 
decision [Maho v State a/Queensland (1992) 66 ALR 408 cited in Wickliffe, 1994] which 
'recognised the doctrine of aboriginal title and rejected the concept of terra nullius (land 
belonging to no-one) as the basis for colonial settlement' (Wickliffe. 1994: 14), Native land 
title had not been extinguished by colonisation. The outcome has been to use legislation 
to limit native title to protect existing interests in natural resources (ibid.), 
Another result of changed legislation has been to attempt joint management regimes to 
ensure effective Aboriginal involvement in resource management and the identification of 
The examples and infOlmation arc from Wickliffe (1994) and Woods and Gordon (1994). 
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cultural sites. Joint management is used in the world heritage parks of Kakadu and Uluru 
(Ayers Rock). The land title was returned to the Aborigines and then leased (99 years) by 
the Crown. Management plans are prepared by a board that has a majority of members 
nominated by the Aboriginal owners. Joint management helps to: reconcile competing 
interests; allocate resources (Aboriginal owners have priority); facilitate public 
understanding; set aside of areas that have significant spiritual values; promote Aboriginal 
management and control; and provide for conservation and public access. 
Canada, in contrast to Australia, uses consultation and the pursuant legislation validates the 
agreements reached. In Canada, the joint management model is based on a comprehensive 
agreement between the Crown and Inuit after direct negotiation and input from third 
parties. The Canadian Government set out to clarify resource ownership and use. They 
wanted Inuit to participate in resource management, conservation (Inuit have priority of 
use) and economic developments, to foster Inuit self-reliance. 
The Nunavut agreement will serve as an example. The main features of the Canadian 
Government's final agreement with Nunavllt are: all laws still apply in the settlement area 
(a new self-governing territory) unless they are inconsistent with the agreement, in which 
case the agreement prevails; financial compensation for past losses: Nunavut ownership of 
the territory and self-government; protection of resource rights (including mineral and 
water) with any negative effect on those rights being subject to compensation; priority of 
resource lise based on wildlife management systems; resource royalty sharing; public access 
for travel and recreation is ensured, in addition there is a 30.5 metre 'Queens Chain'; 
existing third party rights are protected: and the Government retains ultimate responsibility 
for conservation and wildlife'management. The Nunavut people share political and legal 
sovereignty within their territory with the Crown. In regard to wildlife management, the 
Nunavut are given a significant role with the establishment of the Nunavut Wildlife 
Management Board (henceforth, NWMB).3 The NWMB has the authority to manage 
wildlife in the settlement area with the appropriate Minister being noti fled of decisions for 
approval or modification . 
. 1 The NWMB. within the Northwest Territories, hus four Nunavut representatives, one member who lives 
in the Nunuvut Settlement Area, a member appointed by the Commissioner-in-Executive Council, the 
public and Minister for the Canadian Wildlife Service have one representative each, plus u chairperson 
appointed 011 members recommendation. 
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Within AotearoalNew Zealand there is the claim of Ngai Tahu over Tutae Patu lagoon. 
Ngai TaInt are concel1led about the environmental quality of this area. The Waimakariri 
Distriet Council, DoC and Ngai Tahu agreed to a joint management plan for the lagoon and 
the coast from Kairaki Pines north to Waikllkll Beach under the Reserves Act 1977. It is 
proposed that Ngai Tahu get ownership of Tutae Palli. The Minister of Conservation 
would have to be sure that conservation and wildlife management objectives were met 
regardless of ownership. The Canterbury Conservation Board favoured transfer of 
ownership because it was a low priority area and they were unlikely to increase or improve 
the management of it in the near future. This would be in 'best interests of the site' 
(Woods and Gordon, 1994:74). Special legislation is required to make these changes and 
Ngai Tahu would need to produce a management plan. Interest groups and the public 
would need to be consulted because such changes have implications for conservation, 
recreation and public access in the area. Ngai Tahu would maintain existing public access. 
This case is much less complex than that of Ngiiti Kahungunu and Te Whanganui-a-
OrolulAhurir; Estuary but it shows that there are structures in place to pursue a joint 
management approach to coastal resources. Issues of who is responsible for public 
education, consultation and resourcing the process need to be dealt with. 
Australia had, until the Moho decision, used the doctrine of IeI'm nullius. In Canada only 
the Crown could alienate land from native peoples (Like the Crown's right of pre-emption 
in AOlearoa/New Zealand). Australia reinstated Aboriginal ownership over two important 
sites, Kakadu and Uluru (Ayers Rock)' which formed a foundation for the joint 
management of them. Canada also resolved the issue of land ownership and returned to 
Nunavut a political territory of '350,000 square kilometres of land of which 36,000 will 
include mineral rights' (Wickliffe, 1994: 105). Canada has 'advanced leaps and bounds 
ahead' of AotearoalNew Zealand in the negotiation and settlement of indigenous peoples 
claims to ownership or natural resources and has focused on 'consensus settlements' 
(Wickliffe, 1994:8). Aotea/'oa/New Zealand, unlike Canada4, 'has no constitutional 
protection for Maori treaty (sic) and aboriginal rights' (ibid.). Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi is 
recognised as 'legally unenforceable' (ibid.) but it does have moral force. In Canada, 
treaties are recognised as mutually binding obligations and ambiguities are to be construed 
in favour of native peoples as part of the Crown's fiduciary obligation - a relalionship of 
4 In Canadu the Supreme Court recognises thut aboriginal title (customury usc and occupation) is an 
independent legal right to resource ownership that is more than a personal and usufructuary right. These 
uboriginal rights cun only be extinguished by unambiguous means. 
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trust. Further to this, Inuit are given priority of interest and use in the allocation of limited 
natural resources. At the same time the need to respect and deal equitably with the lawful 
rights of others, public and third parties, is recognised. 
Australian and Canadian Governments returned land to indigenous people and use joint 
management, as the result of major legislative changes due to continued pressure from 
indigenous peoples. The Aotearoa/New Zealand Government has been under similar 
pressure due to Waitangi Tribunal findings in favour of Miiori people. The chullenge is 
for AOlearoa/New Zealand to return resources and land that were illegitimately alienated 
from tangala Whel111a, thereby giving Maori ownership of their resources and the ability 
to be directly involved in the management of natural resources with LAs. I agree with 
Wicklitfe (1994: 10) that 
[T/lle lise (~t:i()il1f management regimes appears to be a use./ill and workable 
strategy fhr ensuring indigenous participation in, and therefore 
responsihility for, sound environmental outcomes in the negotiation and 
selflemellt q{ claims. and ./01' the .fitfllre management of natural resources 
11l1der negotiation. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The acknowledgment of indigenous "ownership" of taongalnatural resources based on Te 
Tiriti a Waitangi would provide Ngatj Kahungunu with opportunities to ensure that their 
cultural values are accommodated in environmental planning. This would form a good 
toundation for Ngc7ti Kalnmgul1u and LAs to share the management of common resources. 
Until such time as Ngt7ti Kallllngul1l1 ownership is recognised. the use of a joint 
management strategy for managing Te Wlwl1gclI1l1i-a-OrotuIAhuril'i Estuary may be 
appropriate. Joint management is not dependent on who has ownership or the resources. 
Joint management would take Ngc"iti Kahungul1u involvement beyond the process of 
consultation. The RMA Sectiol1 33 does provide the potential solution to the integration of 
traditional and Western scientific paradigms for resource management. It will, however, 
take much negotiation because there are major ditferences between the Ngati Kahungunu 
paradigm and the SWP. As Ted stated 
.. . .. they [Maori! should have a say in how their society [Neltv Zealand) is 
operating because unti/no¥\' they can righ{fitl~v say they haven't. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Conclusions 
The management of natural resources is often plagued with conflicts. In this case the 
conflict considered was that of cultural values. The values held by the LAs differed from 
those of Ngali Kahungul1u. The original research question was 'Can the implementation 
of the RMA incorporate two cultural perspectives for managing laol1ga/natural resources'?' 
After examining the case of Ngali Kalnmgul1l1 and Te Whanganui-a-OroluIAhuriri Estuary \ 
the answer is 'only partially'. The RMA sections that would allow greater input by Ngiiti 
Ka!JlIl1glll1u into resource management are constrained by a 'secular Western paradigm'. 
This paradigm dominates resource management values and the current reliance on Western 
knowledge, while down-playing indigenous knowledge and values. As a result of the 
unwillingness of the Crown and LAs to give Ng{lfi Kahlingunu an equal palinership in 
resource management and to accommodate their cultural values, the RMA does not 
accommodate different cultural values that could be part of resource management. 
The MlioJ'i spiritual paradigm and the secular Western paradigm are fundamentally 
different. The outcome is that there are minimal similarities in meaning attached to natural 
resources or the 'workable arrangements' for the allocation of resources. Therefore, the 
common property regime found in collective societies, like Ngiili KahungUI111, is based on 
the view that common resources are taonga gifted by atua. hvilhapu do not presume to 
own these resources, rather they are trustees chosen by the alua to be the kaitiaki of the 
taonga/natural resources. hvil!Japli controlled the access to and use of these resources for 
communal benefits, in gratitude to and respect for allia and their llipllna. This strong 
spiritual dynamic differs from the SWP which considers common resources to be free and 
accessible for all people. One exception is when common resources, for protection (for 
example, the Conscrvation estate), are vest cd into the State's ownership and control for all 
the citizens' bene lit. Many Plikehc7 respondents thought that all common resources should 
be managed, by 'one law' for the 'common good'. This was understood to be the role of 
LAs and the Crown, and a reason why Ngciti Kahungul1u ought not have too big a stake 
in resource management. 
The second ractor that constrains the accommodation of Ngilli Kahungunu values in 
resource management is the issue of tanga/ira/anga and limited sovereignty. The Crown's 
stance 0[' absolute indivisible sovereignty assumes both ownership and regulatory interests 
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of all resources and only grants value and use interest of resources to Ngati Kahul1gul1u. 
The unilateral management of taonga/natural resources in Aotearoa/New Zealand is 
untenable because Maori, as a Treaty partner, will continue to put pressure on the Crown 
to involve them in resource management beyond current levels. 
There has been an increasing level of LA consultation with Ngati Kahungunu and the 
incorporation of Ngliti Kahungwlll values, as statements, in LA statutory plans. This 
appears to have reduced the conflict, but it has not resolved it. Consultation has occurred 
because it is a legal requirement not because of any obligation to honour the Treaty. 
Neither has this produced an effective Treaty partnership in which Ngiiti Ka!JlIngllnll 
cultural values are accommodated in the daily management of /aonga/natural resources. 
This is because there has been no change in the fundamental arrangements of Crown 
resource ownership or regulation. 
Ray II Our judicial and legislative procedures (Ire based on European 
systems .... Ollr whole fbcus is commerce.... a Ellropean concept. 
proper~v and ownership. How the Trea~)1 q/, Waitangi - particlllar(l' 
Article IJ - is understood is the essence R/' the dehate a/Jolll which 
mltl/ral values have priori(l'. 
Through the European colonisation of Aotearoa/New Zealand and subsequent' land sales' 
(Chapters One and Two), Ngiiti Kahllngunu lost their taongo/natural resources, and with 
it their economic base. The subsequent domination of a SWP has exacerbated the lack of 
accommodation of Ngiiti Kahungul1u cultural values (Chapter Five) in the management of 
their tuol1ga/natural resources. European colonisation also led to fundamental changes in 
the administration of resource rights and property ownership (Chapter Six). Today the 
regulation and ownership of common resources is deemed to be the Government's role 
(Chapter Seven). This too, I have argued, has undermined Te Tirifi 0 Waitangi, particularly 
Article 11. The "essential bargain" of the Treaty means that the recognition of dual 
sovereignty is ultimately the only way forward in fornling a partnership between Ngiiti 
Kahul7gul1u and LAs, as Crown agents. Chapter Eight then suggested one way forward, 
with a 'Joint Management Model' for the management of laongalnatural resources in 
AotearoalNew Zealand, 
Ng(/ti Kal1llngllll1l have a history of trying to work with the Crown; the failure in Treaty 
pattnership has not been from their lack of effort. The Ng(7ti Ka/llIl1gul1u claim for Te 
Whallgal1l/i~a-OrotllIA/1l/ri"i Estuary is based solidly on their historical and cultural 
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associations with the area. Ngiiti Kahungunu, as the first occupants, have aboriginal title 
and sovereignty. For these reasons Ngiiti Kahungunu, should be given priority of use and 
access to Te Whanganui-a-OrotuIAhurirl Estuary. This would restore their mana whel1ua 
and enable them to exercise rangatiratanga. They had also been promised exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of their lands, waters and forests in Te Tititi 0 Waitangi Article fl. 
Today the SWP is being challenged, involving a potential shift in values to accommodate 
tikal1ga I11clo/'i in resource management. But there is still a long way to go. One of the 
greatest barriers is that LAs do not consider themselves as Crown agents and expect the 
Government to set the stage for how they might accommodate Ngiiti Kahungul111 in their 
environmental plannitig. Possible solutions might be for the LAs to provide better public 
information about the Treaty; to employ Ngati Kahungul1u consultants (and to pay for the 
expertise); and, to provide educational and training sponsorship to equip Ngati Kahungul1u 
as resource managers. These strategies would enable Ngati Kahlingul1u to participate more 
effectively in resource management. In the long term it would reduce the costs of 
consultation because, as partners, both Ngati Kahungul1u and the HBRC, NCC, HDC and 
DoC would be moving in the same direction. There will be a need for compromise. 
This case study was limited in its scope and has identified some further areas for research. 
There is a need for research by Ngafi Kahul1gll11u into their own systems of environmental 
stewardship and how it might be applied in today. How the sacred/secular continuum 
relates to the environmental values held by different ethnic groups within AotearoalNew 
Zealand needs to be researched. The relationship between environmental philosophy and 
M(/ort environmental thought needs more exploration. 
The results or this, and subsequent, research would need to be acted on in a partnership 
between the Crown and hilplIli'rvi. The HBRC, NeC, HDC and DoC, as Crown agents, will 
need to consider other means of facilitating resource management partnerships, since the 
objections to using Section 33 of the RMA to transfer powers to Ngati Kahungunu need to 
be overcome. This too will need research. 
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Appendix One: Historic Map of Te Whanganui a OrotulAhuriri Estuary 
(Alrur;r; Estuary Draft Management Plan 1991) 
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Appendix Two: Ahuriri Estuary Management Areas 
(AlllIriri Draft Management Plan 1991) 
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Appendix Three: Status of Ownership and Control within Ahuriri Estuary 
(Alrurir; Estuary Draft Management Plan 1991) 
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Appendix Four: Texts of Te Tiriti 0 Waitallgi (from Kawharu. 1994:316) 
The Tex:! in English 
Her Majesty Vic:.oria Queen of ::t1e Unitsd Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland regarding with Her 
Royal ~avour me Native Chiefs and Tribes 0/ New 
Zealand and anxious :.0 ;:rcteet ':heir just Rights and 
ProperT)' ana :.0 secure :c :."lem :he enjoyment 0/ 
?eace and Good Ordar ha.:s CGemed it na.:::essary in 
consequence ot :.he great :1umcer ot Her Majesl't's 
Subjee:s wno have alrea<::y sealed in New Zealand 
and rne rapid extension of Emigration both from 
Europe and Australia wnicl'l is soU in p~res.s Ie 
constituts and appoint a tunQOnar'( property 
authonzed :c :reat with :l':e AbcIrigines ot New 
Zealand :or :ne recognition of Her Majesr:y's 
Sovereign authority over ':he whole or any part 01 
thos.e :.slands·Her Majesty ':here/Qre being desirous 
to i:lstanlish a seded 'onn 0/ Clva Government with 
a '/iew to avert :ne evil eor.sec;uences which must 
result from the abs.ence 0/ :ne necessaJ"l Laws and 
Inslitutions alike :c ':he na::ve population and Ie Her 
suojec::s ha.:s been graciously plea.:sed Ie empower 
and :c authorize me William Hobson a Caplain in 
Her Majesty'S Royal Navy ~nsul and waut8f'lant 
Govemor of such par.:s 01 New Zealand as may be 
or nereaiter snail be ceoed :c Her Majesty tc invita 
:!'1e conleaeratad and :noeoendent Chiefs of ,'law 
ZeaJaf\d :c concur in :he ~Uowing Anides and 
COnditions. 
Article the Arst 
The Chiefs 01 :he Ccnfeeeracon 01 the Unitad 
Tribes of New Zealand and :1'\e saparate and 
indepeneent Chiets wno have not become 
memoers 01 :he Ccnfeeeraocn cada to Her Majesty 
the Que-en ot England absoiutaty and wittlout 
I'9SeNation all the rig/'lts and powers ot Soven!igl'lty 
wi'licn th& said ~nted&ralion or Indvic!ual Chiefs 
I'9spee:Neiy exerci:se or pess.ess, or may be 
supposed :c exercise or ;:cssess, over :heir 
naspee:Ne Territories as :r.e soia Sovereigns 
thereat. 
Artic!e the Second 
Her Majesty :he Cueen of England continns and 
;uarantelH :c :he Chiefs and Trobes ot New 
Zealand and lO rne respe<=lV1'I lamilles and 
incivlcuals ':hereot :he full axduslll9 and 
uncisturoe<l po511ll'Ssion ot :I':&!r Lands and Estates 
F0I'9113 F'lShenes and o!l1er ;lrcoerties which they 
may CQIIec::illely or indvicually ;:O$s.eu so ioog as it 
is :heir wish and desire :c t'1iItaln :tie same in :nllir 
possession: out tie Chieb 01 :tie Untted Tribes and 
the inc:ivlc!ual Chiefs yield :c Hllr Majesty :he 
uciusive ngnt of PreElmpccn C1'Ier .ucn IanCs as 
!l'1e proprietors :nereot may ::.e dsposed :c alienate 
at suc."\ pli¢es as may '::.e ~~ upon be!Ween :he 
!'es~e ?ropnetcrs and ,::.arsons appointed 'r:!y 
Her ,'.tajesty :c :reat with r,em [n :hat 'cefIalf. 
Article the Third 
in CQn!!ideracon :.hereal ~lIr .'rlajes:y :till Queen 01 
::::gland a:r.tane:s 10 ':he ,",al'les 01 New Zealand 
Her :-oyaJ ;lrotee:on atld 'moar..s to ~lIm ilK ':he 
;::'ign:s and ?l"I\Illeges 01 i:r.:::sn Sucj~. 
(Siqned) 'N Hcc.son ~elJtenant Govemcr 
The Tax:! in Maori 
Ko Wlkltoria ts Kuini 0 Ingaranl i :ana maJ'lara 
atilwai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu 0 Nu ilt'afli i 
tana hial'lia hoki Ida :.onungia i<.i a ratcu 0 ralOU 
rangallraranga me to ratou wenua. a Kia mau :cou 
hoki te Rongo ki a ratcu me :e Atanol'lo holti kua 
wakaaro ia he mea ~ka Kia llklJa mai !lilahi 
RangaIira·hei k.aj wal<at1ta iii nga Tangata maori 0 
N u Tirani • Ida wak.aa.e da Q ng a iianqaara maori :s 
K.awanalilnga 0 :s Kuini !d nga wa!1illalei Q ta 
Wenua mel me nga Motu • na :a mea hoki. i e 
hasre mai nai. 
Na ~o ta Kuini fJ hiahia ana kla wal<.aritaa !a 
K.awil'lolllilnga kla kaua ai ~a Kino e ~lJtl mai ki :a 
lilngata Maori kI 18 Paxena II nOl1o lIJnt ~,. ana.. 
Na. !wa pal te Kuini l<la lllilJa a haI.I a 'Mramu 
Hopihona he K.apitarla i !Ii Rciara. Nawi Mi Kawana 
mo nqa wa.I'!i katca 0 Nu i~ 9 llkua aianei, 
amua atu ki ts Kuini, e mea atU ana !d nqa 
Rangadra 0 t& Wallaminenga :) nga napu Q Nu 
ilt'afli mil era Ra.rl'il atira atu IWl iii lJ re Ic.a korero tia 
nai. 
Ko te tuatalli 
Ko nga R.angatira 0 ts wakaminlWlga me noa 
Rangatira katca hoki ki hai i UN IQ :;nJa 
wak.aminenga k.a llku rawa atu l<i li Kuini 0 
Ingaratli aka tonu atu • !iii Kawanar.anga kalDa 0 0 
ratcu wenua. 
Ko te Tuarua 
Ko ta Kuini 0 Ingaratli ka wall.ar1t.a k.a wa.kaae ki 
nga Rangaara ki nga ha:;lu • ki nga :at19a1:a IWca 0 
Nu Tirani !Ii :inc rangalira.tanga 0 0 ra.tou WWlUl 0 
ratcu kainga me 0 ratcu ::aonga lwca.. OIira k.a 
nga Rangatira 0 ta 'NlIkaminerKJa me l'I9a F\a.n;a!iriI. 
iwoa aw k.a wku ki te K1.iini ts hok.l:::tl9a 0 era wahl 
wenua e pal ai Ie ta.nga!a nona :a WIWlI.Ia • kI tit 
n tenga 0 te utu e 'Nakati tea a.i II I7I:tl:)U k.a 19 k.a.i 
hoKO e meaaa nai e te Kulnl hili kai hok.a mona. 
Ko t8 Tuatoru 
Hel ·NaJ<.aritanga mal hoki :anei mo ts wakaaetan;a 
:<J Ie :-<.awanatanga 0 Ie :-<UII'U • K.a ::ialIlna II :a Kuini 
:) :ngaratli n<;a ::a.ngata. maori kalCa :) Nu 1irani ka 
t1.<kua iii a ratcu nga :~a k.a1Da ntII :aili ki ana 
mea )(J !'Iga ::angata 0 IngataJ'li. 
(Siqne-c) W, Hobson 
Consul and lieutenant Govemcr 
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Appendix Five: Excerpts from the Resource Management Act 1991 
(emphasis added). 
Some of the sections of the RMA that apply specifically to Maori. 
5. Purpose -( I) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable managcment of natural and physical 
resources. 
(2) In this Act. "sustainable management" means managing the use. developnll'nt. and protcction or 
natural and physical resources in a way. or at a rate. which (,llahie,I' Ileoille alld (,()l11l11l11liri(',I' III III'IJI'ic/e 
jill' their social, ('('o//ol11ic. alld (,lIlt"ral \\'('1/ heillg and for their health and safety .... 
6. Matters (If national importance - In achieving the purpose of this Act. all persons exercising functions 
and powers undcr it. in relation to managing the use. development. and protection of natural and physical 
resources. shall recognisc and provide for the fullowing matters of national importance: 
(e) Tile relatiollship 01 !v!aori alld their cllltlll'(' alld tl'aditio/ls II'ith Iheir allcestrallallds, lI'atel', Sil('S, 
1I'(Iohi {((liII. (I//c/ oth('r 100/lgo. 
7. Other Matters - In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under 
it, in relation to managing the use. development. and protection of natural and physical resources. shall 
have particular regurd to -
(a) Kaitiakitanga 
(e) Recognition and protection of the heritage values of sites. buildings. places, or arcas. 
II. Treaty of Waitangi - In achieving the purpose of this Act. ali persons exercising functions and powers 
under it. in relation to managing the usc, development. and protection of natural and physical resources. 
shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi). 
:n. Transfer of powers -( I) A local authority that has functions. powers, or duties under this Act may 
tnlllsfer anyone or more of those functions. powers. or duties to another public authority in accordancc 
with this section, except that it l11ay not transfer any of the following: 
(a) The approval of a policy statement or plan or any changes to a policy statement or plan: 
(b) The issuing oL or the l11aking of a recoillmendation on. a requirement for a designation of a heritnge 
order under Part VIII: 
(c) This powcr of transfer. 
(2) For thc purpose of this section. "public authority" includes any local authority. iwi authority. 
Government department. statutory authority. and joint committee set ur for the purpuses of scction XO. 
(.1) A local iluthority that transfers any function, power, or duty under this section shall continue to be 
respunsible ltlr the exercise thereuf. 
(4) A local authority shall nut transfer any of its functions, powers. or duties under this section unless -
(a) It has used thc special consultative rruccdure srccified in section 716A of thc Local Guvernment Act 
1974: and 
(b) 8elbrL' lIsing that special consultative procedure it serves notice un the Minister of its prorusal to 
transfcr thc function. power. or duty: and 
(c) 80th authorities agree that the transfer is desirable on all of the lulluwing grounds: 
(i) Thc iluthllrity tu which the transfer is made represents the appropriate comillunity of interest 
relating to thc exercise or pertbrl11i1nce of the functiun. power. or duty: 
(ii) Efficicncy: 
(iii) Technical or special capability 01' exp<:>rtise. 
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Appendix Six: Interview Questions 
Background Data 
What is your connection with Ahuriri Estuary? How did you get involved? Why? 
How is(are) the(se) organisation(s) involved in the management Ahuriri Estuary? What is 
your role in the(se) organisations? 
History and Management of Afturiri Estuary 
What does (do you think) Ahuriri Estuary mean(s) to Ngali Kahunglll1ll? 
If Ahu!'iri Estuary is important to Nga/i Kai1l1l1glll1l1, then how might you (they) be able to 
protect your (their) lOanga in public spaces? Is it possible for Ngali Kahul1glll1u to practice 
kailiakilal1ga today? If so, how? If not, what needs to change? 
What is the /vIi/ori involvement in the management of Ahuriri Estuary? Do you think this 
is appropriate? Should Ngiili Kahullgul1u have more say? 
Priority of right to use Afturiri Estuary 
Should /vic/or; values have precedence over Pcikehii values m regard to resource 
management? 
Ngati Kahungunu Participation in Resource Management 
How are Ngc7ti Kahunglll1u able to participate in resource management? 
Do you think that it is ever appropriate for Maori to have exclusive use of a natural 
resource, like A/Illrir; Estuary? Would this be the only way to ensure lil10 Rangaliralanga? 
On the basis of the second article of the Treaty, how do you think Ngc7li Kahungul1u can 
ensure the protection and possession of their resources? 
What is the traditional decision making process for Ngd/i Kahlll1gllllll? Can you give me 
some examples? How does this affect the management of natural resources, your laonga? 
How do you think the Waitangi Tribunal claims being heard in regard to Ahuriri Estuary 
should be decided? How ought Ahuriri Estuary be managed in the ruture? Should Ngilti 
Kahlll1gwllI have the linal say as to how the area is managed? 
The Meaning of Maori Terms 
What do you understand the following /vIc7ori tem1S to mean; lino tangatiratanga, 
/wilillkilanga, 1\'(717, tapll, mahinga kai, mana? 
Is there anyone else that you know who I could talk to about this? 
Appendix Seven: Fold-Out Pseudonym List 
The pseudonyms and their affiliations are: 
Adam: 
Alan: 
Anne: 
Dave: 
Doug: 
Earl: 
Eric: 
Fred: 
Gary: 
Harry: 
Henry: 
Jane: 
Luke: 
Mary: 
Mike: 
Paul: 
Ray: 
Sean: 
Steve: 
Ted: 
• Waitangi Tribunal expert witness, a Piikehii 
• Ngiiti Ka/llIl1gwlll kaumatua, Taiwhenlla committee member 
• Napier City Council (henceforth NCC) 
• Ahuriri Executive Committee, New Zealand Maori Council 
• Department of Conservation (henceforth DoC) 
• Napier City Council 
• Hawke's Bay Regional Council (henceforth HBRC) 
• Tikal1ga Maori expert 
• Hawke's Bay Fish and Game Council 
• Department of Conservation, HBRC Maori Committee member 
• Hastings District Council (henceforth HOC) 
• Ahuriri Protection Society ~ conservation interest group 
.. Past Catchment Board member 
.. A IllIriri Estuary resource user 
• Hawke's Bay Regional Council 
.. AlllIriri Estuary resource user 
• Hastings District Council 
• Waitangi Tribunal expert witness 
• Hastings District Council, Taiwhemta Committee member 
.. Although !viC/Oft he was not tangata whel1l1a 
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